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ARTICLES
POLICE VEHICLE SEARCHES AND RACIAL
PROFILING: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
Griffin Edwards* & Stephen Rushin**
In 1981, the U.S. Supreme Court held in New York v. Belton that police
officers could lawfully search virtually anywhere in a vehicle without a
warrant after the arrest of any occupant in the vehicle. Then, in 2009, the
Court reversed course in Arizona v. Gant, holding that police could only
engage in vehicle searches after such arrests in a smaller number of
extenuating circumstances. This series of cases became a flash point for the
broader debate about the regulation of policing. Law enforcement groups
argued that administratively complex rules, like those established in Gant,
risk officer safety. But some scholars and civil rights activists worried that
by giving police officers wider discretion to search vehicles incident to
arrest, the Belton rule may have led to unjustified civil rights violations and
racial profiling.
This Article argues that, by limiting vehicle searches incident to arrest,
Gant may have disincentivized policing tactics that disproportionately target
individuals of color without jeopardizing officer safety.
By utilizing a data set of traffic stops from thirteen law enforcement
agencies in seven states, this Article presents an empirical study of the effects
of shifting doctrines related to vehicle searches incident to arrest. This
Article makes two findings. First, it finds no evidence that Gant endangered
officer safety. Changes in state doctrines related to vehicle searches incident
to arrest are not associated with increases in assaults of officers during
traffic stops. Second, it hypothesizes that Gant may have reduced racial
profiling. Gant may be linked to a somewhat larger decline in vehicle
searches incident to arrest for nonwhite individuals relative to white
individuals.
These findings are a reminder that seemingly neutral procedural choices
by courts in regulating police behavior may have racially disparate effects.
* Griffin Edwards is an Associate Professor at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. He
has a Ph.D. in Economics from Emory University.
** Stephen Rushin is the Judge Hubert Louis Will Professor of Law at Loyola University
Chicago School of Law. Ph.D. and J.D., University of California, Berkeley. This Article
benefited from the Loyola University Chicago summer research program. We thank our
colleagues who provided feedback on this paper. We also thank Maria Carolina Gomez for
excellent research assistance.
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We conclude by arguing for the narrowing of the discretionary authority of
police officers as a mechanism for reducing disparities in the criminal justice
system.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last several years, American policing has undergone a racial
reckoning.1 The murder of George Floyd at the hands of Minneapolis police
1. See, e.g., John Eligon & Audra D.S. Burch, After a Summer of Racial Reckoning, Race
Is on the Ballot, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/30/us/racialjustice-elections.html [https://perma.cc/7MAK-HDCF] (describing the summer of 2020 as a
racial reckoning after the death of George Floyd); William Barber II & Jonathan
Wilson-Hartgrove, Opinion, A Cry of ‘I Can’t Breathe’ United a Generation in a Gasp for
Justice, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/21/opinion/georgefloyd-death-william-barber.html [https://perma.cc/R9Z9-YXSJ] (discussing how the murder
of George Floyd stands alongside the killings of Trayvon Martin, Emmett Till, and others as
triggers of social upheaval and reform); Looking Back at a Year-Long Racial Reckoning Since
George Floyd’s Killing, PBS (May 25, 2021, 6:52 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/
show/looking-back-at-a-year-long-racial-reckoning-since-george-floyds-killing
[https://perma.cc/9AJB-SVZJ] (documenting the one-year anniversary of Floyd’s death and
how the event has changed the country).
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and the ensuing nationwide protests2 have spurred broader examinations of
how the law regulating police behavior has allowed—and in some cases
actively facilitated—the marginalization of individuals of color.3 The
subsequent nationwide conversation over policing has exposed long-standing
debates about the trade-offs involved in the regulation of officer behavior.4
Civil rights advocates have pushed for additional oversight5 and
accountability,6 with some arguing for a narrowing of the scope of policing,7

2. Radhika Chalasani, George Floyd Protests Aren’t Just Happening in Big Cities, ABC
NEWS (June 20, 2020, 11:29 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/article/george-floyd-protestshappening-big-cities/story?id=71327256 [https://perma.cc/C4UY-H4UT] (“Protests against
racial injustice and police brutality, spurred by the death of George Floyd . . . aren’t just
happening in major U.S. cities, but in smaller cities as well as small towns.”); see also Alex
Altman, Why the Killing of George Floyd Sparked an American Uprising, TIME (June 4, 2020,
6:49 AM), https://time.com/5847967/george-floyd-protests-trump/ [https://perma.cc/LJD27MH6] (describing how the “horrific video” of “white Minneapolis police officer Derek
Chauvin casually kneeling on the victim’s neck . . . has spurred a national uprising”).
3. For example, the killing of George Floyd inspired the proposal of the George Floyd
Justice in Policing Act. See Sean Collins, The House Has Passed the George Floyd Justice in
Policing Act, VOX (Mar. 3, 2021, 9:34 PM), https://www.vox.com/2021/3/3/22295856/georgefloyd-justice-in-policing-act-2021-passed-house [https://perma.cc/47K3-H4TP] (describing
how the measure would make numerous reforms to policing, including banning chokeholds
and ending qualified immunity).
4. See, e.g., Deborah Becker, How the George Floyd Protests Sparked Debate About—
and
Among—Law
Enforcement
in
Mass.,
WBUR
(June
4,
2020),
https://www.wbur.org/news/2020/06/04/massachusetts-law-enforcement-debate-georgelloyd [https://perma.cc/E6JL-ESTQ] (outlining reform efforts in Massachusetts and pushback
from police officer groups).
5. See, e.g., Makini Brice & Richard Cowan, U.S. House Passes ‘George Floyd’ Police
Reform Bill, Senate Prospects Unclear, REUTERS (Mar. 3, 2021, 10:01 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-congress-police/u-s-house-passes-george-floydpolice-reform-bill-senate-prospects-unclear-idUSKCN2AW07N
[https://perma.cc/94J35NSY] (describing in part how the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act would increase
support for and establish requirements surrounding oversight mechanisms like body cameras).
6. See, e.g., Dirk VanderHart, Oregon Legislative Session on Police Accountability
Coming Soon, OR. PUB. BROAD. (June 11, 2020, 6:08 PM), https://www.opb.org/news/article/
police-accountability-arbitration-oregon-special-session-legislature [https://perma.cc/Y4UEKTDW] (describing a new law in Oregon that changes procedures for police disciplinary
appeals by limiting the scope of arbitrator review); Steve Benham, Police Reform Plan
Restricts Arbitrator from Overturning Discipline Decisions, KATU (June 22, 2020),
https://katu.com/news/politics/police-reform-plan-restricts-arbitrator-from-overturningdiscipline-decisions [https://perma.cc/5PPQ-44ES] (same). This reform proposal ultimately
became law. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.706 (West 2022).
7. See, e.g., Christy E. Lopez, Defund the Police?: Here’s What That Really Means,
WASH. POST (June 7, 2020, 6:37 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/07/
defund-police-heres-what-that-really-means [https://perma.cc/9YS3-5C8F] (explaining that
many supporters of defunding approaches actually support reducing the scope of police
responsibilities); Ryan W. Miller, What Does ‘Defund the Police’ Mean and Why
Some Say ‘Reform’ Is Not Enough, USA TODAY (June 8, 2020, 3:02 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/06/08/what-does-defund-police-meangeorge-floyd-black-lives-matter/5317240002 [https://perma.cc/R6YE-8PHD] (describing the
expanding role of policing in recent decades and the arguments in favor of reducing the scope
of police responsibilities). For an example of a scholarly proposal to concretely limit the scope
of police responsibilities, see Jordan Blair Woods, Traffic Without the Police, 73 STAN. L.
REV. 1471 (2021) (supporting the removal of police officers from traffic enforcement in many
cases).
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defunding,8 and/or abolition.9 In response, police chiefs and union leaders
have claimed that additional reforms and regulations risk officer safety10 and
impair their ability to fight crime.11 Although the murder of George Floyd
shone a light on these issues, scholars, civil rights advocates, and policing
leaders have long debated how to best regulate policing in a manner that
balances safety and civil rights.
Few criminal procedure cases better illustrate this tension than the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in Arizona v. Gant.12 There, the Court
analyzed a rather technical issue of criminal procedure: whether a police
officer could automatically search a vehicle incident to the arrest of an
occupant of the vehicle.13 But despite its seemingly narrow scope, the case
emerged as a flash point for the broader debate over police regulation.
Policing advocates argued that officers needed a clear, bright-line rule that
permitted them to search vehicles any time they arrest a vehicle occupant.14

8. See, e.g., KATE HAMAJI, KUMAR RAO, MARBRE STAHLY-BUTTS, JANAÉ BONSU,
CHARLENE CARRUTHERS, ROSELYN BERRY & DENZEL MCCAMPBELL, CTR. FOR POPULAR
DEMOCRACY ET AL., FREEDOM TO THRIVE: REIMAGINING SAFETY & SECURITY IN OUR
COMMUNITIES 1 (2017), https://populardemocracy.org/sites/default/files/Freedom%20To%20
Thrive%2C%20Higher%20Res%20Version.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZL7-8Q88] (providing a
detailed case by an advocacy organization for defunding the police). For a scholarly
assessment generally supporting defunding framing and approaches, see Jessica Eaglin, To
‘Defund’ the Police, 73 STAN. L. REV. 120 (2021). But cf. Stephen Rushin & Roger Michalski,
Police Funding, 72 FLA. L. REV. 277 (2020) (generally opposing defunding as a remedy to
officer misconduct).
9. See, e.g., Mariame Kaba, Yes, We Mean Literally Abolish the Police, N.Y. TIMES (June
12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/12/opinion/sunday/floyd-abolish-defundpolice.html [https://perma.cc/PB8M-JGMV] (supporting a full abolition of police departments
as we know them). For a scholarly discussion of abolition, see generally ALEX S. VITALE, THE
END OF POLICING (2017) (generally supporting a version of abolition) and Amna Akbar, An
Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1781 (2020) (also supporting an
abolitionist frame).
10. See, e.g., Michel Martin, Law Professor on California’s New Use of Force Law, NPR
(Aug. 24, 2019; 5:13 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/24/754052321/law-professor-oncalifornia-s-new-police-use-of-force-law [https://perma.cc/B3AR-ARNV] (discussing the
implications of a new use of force reform in California on, among other things, officer safety).
11. See, e.g., Griff Witte & David Weigel, With Violent Crime Spiking, the Push for Police
Reform Collides with Voters’ Fears, WASH. POST (May 16, 2021, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/police-reform-push-sputters/2021/05/15/
5e075848-b426-11eb-a3b5-f994536fe84a_story.html
[https://perma.cc/95WD-PAJH]
(documenting how surging violent crime rates in many of the nation’s largest cities have
renewed some opposition to reform efforts and spurred more pushback from law enforcement
groups); Asma Khalid, An Old Friend of Law Enforcement, Biden Walks a Thin Line on Police
Reform, NPR (July 8, 2021, 7:50 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/07/06/1013266729/bidentries-to-balance-calls-to-reform-the-police-amid-more-mass-shootings
[https://perma.cc/
5DRW-52PB] (explaining how President Joe Biden’s criminal justice reform proposals must
be balanced against the reality of increasing violent crime sweeping the nation).
12. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
13. Id. at 335 (explaining the procedural posture of the case and describing how the lower
court concluded that under these circumstances, the Fourth Amendment did not permit such
automatic vehicle searches).
14. Brief for National Association of Policing Organizations, Inc. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 4–7, Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (No. 07-542) (describing
the challenge of learning all of the aspects of criminal procedure rulings as “daunting” for
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Any other rule, they argued, would impair officer safety and create an
ambiguous, unmanageable standard.15 But civil rights advocates claimed
that a broad rule permitting any search after an arrest of a vehicle occupant
violated the Fourth Amendment by allowing officers too much discretion to
engage in unnecessary and intrusive searches.16 Instead, civil rights
advocates pushed the Court to adopt a narrower and admittedly more
complicated standard—that police could only search vehicles incident to an
arrest if the search was necessary to protect officer safety or if the search was
necessary to preserve evidence related to the reason for the arrest.17
Although it was administratively more difficult to employ, civil rights
advocates believed that this rule would better protect privacy in a manner
consistent with Fourth Amendment requirements.18 The Court ultimately
sided with civil rights advocates in overturning the dominant interpretation
of its previous ruling in New York v. Belton19 and narrowing the opportunities
for police to search vehicles incident to arrest.20 Across a lengthy majority
opinion, concurrence, and two dissents, the justices used Gant as an
opportunity to debate the trade-offs implicit in this kind of police
regulation.21 Little research has examined the effects of the Gant decision or
its broader implications for the discussion and literature on police regulation.
By using traffic stop data from the Stanford Open Policing Project
database22 covering thirteen law enforcement agencies across seven states,
this Article presents an empirical evaluation of the effects of shifting
doctrines on vehicle searches incident to arrest. Because of the unique
police officers and arguing that police “surely do not need to have the bright-line rule of Belton
and Thornton replaced with an amorphous contingency”).
15. Id. at 1–4 (claiming generally that “[l]aw enforcement work, never particularly safe,
has unfortunately become even more dangerous to the men and women who enforce our social
contract at great personal risk” and arguing that changing the Belton rule would further
endanger officer safety).
16. Brief for Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in
Support of Respondent at 22–28, Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (No. 07-542) (arguing
that the Belton standard is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment).
17. Brief of the National Association of Federal Defenders as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Respondent at 4–6, Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (No. 07-542) (defending the
Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling narrowing the scope of permissible law enforcement searches
of arrestees’ vehicles incident to arrest to these circumstances).
18. Id. at 3 (“Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to not allow automatic vehicle
searches after an arrestee is secured provides a straightforward and readily manageable rule.”).
19. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
20. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 347 (2009) (“For these reasons, we are unpersuaded
by the State’s arguments that a broad reading of Belton would meaningfully further law
enforcement interests and justify a substantial intrusion on individuals’ privacy.”).
21. See generally id. (majority opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens, concurrence by
Justice Antonin Scalia, and dissenting opinions by Justices Stephen Breyer and Alito).
22. STANFORD
OPEN
POLICING
PROJECT,
https://openpolicing.stanford.edu
[https://perma.cc/AZ52-N8NA] (last visited Sept. 2, 2022) (click on “view data” and navigate
to the list of jurisdictions); see also Emma Pierson, Camelia Simoiu, Jan Overgoor, Sam
Corbett-Davies, Daniel Jenson, Amy Shoemaker, Vignesh Ramachandran, Phoebe Barghouty,
Cheryl Phillips, Ravi Shroff & Sharad Goel, A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in
Police Stops Across the United States, 4 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 736, 736–37 (2020) (the paper
that resulted from the data collection by these researchers).
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jurisdictional variation in laws on searches incident to arrest across these
seven states, we estimate the effect of these kinds of doctrinal changes on
officer safety, stops, arrests, and searches. We make two findings. First,
using data from the Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted
(LEOKA) Data Collection,23 we fail to find evidence that Gant or Gant-like
state equivalent rules endanger officer safety. Jurisdictions that adopted
more restrictive rules on searches incident to arrest saw no subsequent
increases in officer assaults or deaths relative to jurisdictions with less
restrictive rules.24 These findings are insensitive to various alternative
modeling choices, giving us some confidence that Gant-like regulations had
minimal effects on officer safety.
Second, we find that Gant was not associated with any statistically
significant change in officer behavior in the aggregate.25 Jurisdictions that
moved from the lax Belton doctrine to the more restrictive Gant doctrine saw
no statistically significant change in the frequency of searches that
co-occurred with arrests during traffic stops. This could suggest that, after
Gant, officers simply used alternative means, like inventory searches,26 to
search many of the same vehicles that they would have previously searched
under the more expansive Belton doctrine. When we break down our results
by race, however, we uncover a more pronounced decline in officer stops,
arrests, and searches incident to arrest for individuals of color relative to
white individuals after Gant.27 Although limitations inherent to our models
and the limited available data prevent us from making definitive causal
conclusions, we hypothesize that this statistical pattern may be attributed to
officers previously using the broad discretionary authority granted by Belton
to more frequently target drivers of color.28 By reducing the opportunities
for officers to engage in some vehicle searches incident to arrest, Gant may
have disincentivized pretextual tactics generally.29
23. Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
(2020), https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr/leoka [https://perma.cc/5NRQ-U6GA].
24. See infra Part IV.A. and figs.2 & 3 (showing both the raw trend lines and the more
sophisticated modeling).
25. See infra Part IV.B. and fig.4 (presenting the results of our modeling).
26. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375–76 (1987) (holding that police officers
could search closed containers inside an impounded vehicle as part of an inventory search, so
long as the search is carried out pursuant to a standard policy of documenting contents of a
vehicle after impounding, and not as part of a bad faith effort to merely investigate criminal
conduct); cf. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990) (conversely holding that the search of a
locked suitcase taken out of the trunk of an impounded car, without any set policies on
inventory searches, was not valid under the inventory search exception).
27. See Part IV.B and fig.5 (showing the comparative changes in searches incident to
arrest for white drivers and drivers of color).
28. See infra Parts IV.B and Conclusion and accompanying text.
29. It is important to transparently recognize the limitations of our study. We cannot
definitively say that changes to doctrine on searches incident to arrest were the single, causal
contributor to the subsequent changes in officer behavior that we observe. Like any study of
law, race, and policing, it is near impossible to attribute causation with certainty. We do our
best to consider alternative explanations and introduce a range of control variables.
Nevertheless, this study—like most similar studies—should be viewed as not only empirical
but also theory-building in nature.
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Based on this hypothesis, we conclude by considering the implications of
these findings for the literature on policing. Our findings refute the officer
safety narrative that has pushed courts and policy makers to adopt rules that
defer to police discretionary authority.30 This is not to say that police
regulations will never risk officer safety, but it provides evidence that some
opposition to police regulation on officer safety grounds may be overstated.
Additionally, our findings show that Gant may have had effects that some
civil rights advocates at the time did not fully appreciate or predict. At the
time of Gant, neither the amici, the petitioner, nor the justices discussed the
implications of the decision on communities of color.31 The findings from
this Article are a reminder that seemingly neutral procedural choices by
courts in regulating police behavior may have racially disparate effects.
Thus, we conclude by arguing for the narrowing of the discretionary
authority of police officers as a mechanism for reducing disparities in the
criminal justice system.32
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I walks through the history of
court doctrines on searches incident to arrest, as well as the reactions to
Belton and Gant. Part II discusses the Article’s methodology, including the
jurisdictional variation and data set that make our analysis possible. Part III
presents the results of our modeling. Finally, Part IV evaluates the
implications of our findings for the discussion and literature on policing.
I. REGULATION OF SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST
Courts have long debated the scope of police authority to conduct searches
incident to a suspect’s arrest. Courts have granted police the authority under
the Fourth Amendment33 to conduct searches of a suspect’s clothing incident
to arrest to preserve evidence on the suspect’s person and to identify potential
weapons that could endanger officer safety.34 But do the same safety and
30. For a broader discussion of the officer safety or officer danger narrative, see Jordan
Blair Woods, Policing, Danger Narratives, and Routine Traffic Stops, 117 MICH. L. REV. 635,
668–84 (2019) (presenting statistical data on the risks facing law enforcement during traffic
stops). See generally Michael Sierra-Arévalo, American Policing and the Danger Imperative,
55 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 70 (2021) (describing how, despite the declining risk to physical safety
to police officers in the United States, socialization about the safety risks of police work
facilitate harmful culture practices and deviant behavior).
31. A review of the case text, including dissents, concurrences, and amicus briefs, found
no substantial discussion of how the decision may disproportionately impact communities of
color.
32. See infra Part IV.C.
33. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
34. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“It is the fact of the lawful arrest
which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial
arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.”).
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evidentiary justifications impliedly grant police the right to search the
physical space near and around the suspect, like homes or automobiles?
This part chronicles the progression of Supreme Court cases regulating
searches incident to arrest. It starts by considering the Court’s decision in
Chimel v. California,35 where the Court evaluated the scope of police power
to search homes incident to the arrest of a person inside that home.36
Although not dealing with searches of vehicles, the precedent established in
Chimel served as a basis for the Court’s later decisions on vehicle searches.
Next, this part chronicles the Court’s ruling in New York v. Belton, which
gave officers wide latitude to search vehicles incident to arrest, and the
subsequent Arizona v. Gant decision that narrowed this authority
substantially. It concludes by documenting the reactions to Gant and the
prior literature on vehicle searches incident to arrest.
A. Chimel v. California
Before considering the scope of searches incident to arrest in automobiles,
the Supreme Court first grappled with a similar issue involving arrests inside
homes in Chimel v. California. The facts in Chimel were undisputed.37 In
September 1965, three police officers in Santa Ana, California, knocked on
Ted Chimel’s door intending to execute an arrest warrant for burglary.38 Mr.
Chimel’s wife allowed the police inside to wait until Mr. Chimel arrived
home from work about ten to fifteen minutes later.39 When Mr. Chimel
arrived home, the police handed him the arrest warrant and asked permission
to “look around” his home.40 Mr. Chimel objected to this request, but the
officers told him they were permitted to search his home incident to an
arrest.41 The officers did not have a search warrant permitting them to
conduct such a search.42
The officers then conducted a detailed search of the Chimels’ home over
the course of nearly an hour, including opening drawers inside their
bedroom.43 The officers found several coins that they believed to be the
fruits of Mr. Chimel’s burglary. The trial court later admitted these coins
into evidence against Mr. Chimel at trial.44 The jury convicted Mr. Chimel
of burglary.45 On appeal, Mr. Chimel argued that the coins seized from his

35. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
36. Id. at 753.
37. See id.
38. See id. (noting that police suspected Mr. Chimel of burglarizing a coin shop).
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 753–54 (explaining the police officers’ insistence that their conduct was lawful
incident to an arrest inside a home).
42. Id. at 754 (“No search warrant had been issued.”).
43. Id. (describing the areas searched by the officers, including the attic, garage, three
bedrooms, and the family’s workshop).
44. Id.
45. Id. (also noting that Mr. Chimel’s conviction for two counts of burglary was upheld
below by the California appellate court and the Supreme Court of California).
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home were obtained unlawfully in violation of the Fourth Amendment.46
Thus, in Chimel, the Supreme Court had to decide whether police officers
could conduct a search of a home incident to arrest without a warrant. And,
if so, how far that search may extend into the home. As the Court
acknowledged, prior decisions on these issues had been “far from consistent,
as even the most cursory review makes evident.”47
The Court ultimately held that the officers violated Mr. Chimel’s Fourth
Amendment rights when they engaged in a warrantless search of his entire
home incident to arrest.48 The justices were careful to acknowledge that
some types of searches incident to arrest are necessary to remove weapons
and to protect officer safety.49 They also agreed that an officer may
reasonably search for and seize easily accessible evidence that may be
destroyed or concealed if not for law enforcement action.50 Nevertheless, the
Court held that these types of searches must be limited to areas where an
arrestee “might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items.”51 This
reasoning does not extend to a broader search of a home, like the one
conducted in the Chimels’ home.52
Finally, the Court acknowledged that any rule broadly permitting police to
search a suspect’s home incident to arrest inside that home could give police
a perverse incentive. Officers may prefer to wait until a suspect enters their
home before executing an arrest as it would give the officers an extensive
license to engage in an otherwise unwarranted and unconstitutional search.53
Thus, after Chimel, the Court made clear that searches of homes incident to
arrest were narrowly limited to a relatively small area around the arrestee.
And these searches must generally be done to ensure officer safety or to
preserve evidence.54 However, Chimel did not address whether a similar rule
would apply to other searches incident to arrest, most notably searches of
automobiles.

46. Id. at 754–55.
47. Id. at 755.
48. Id. at 763–64 (holding that “[t]here is no comparable justification, however, for
routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs—or, for that matter, for
searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself,”
and saying that this violated the Fourth Amendment).
49. Id. at 762–63 (“Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated.”).
50. Id. at 763 (“In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for
and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or
destruction.”).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 763–64.
53. Id. at 767 (noting that the Court cannot say that such a tactic was used here, but also
acknowledging that if the police had executed the arrest warrant while the defendant was at
work, the officers would clearly have no grounds for a search of his home absent a warrant).
54. See id. at 764.
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B. New York v. Belton
In New York v. Belton, the Court next considered how to apply its doctrine
regarding searches incident to arrest to the context of automobiles.55 The
case originated from the arrest of Roger Belton in 1978 by a New York state
police officer after a routine traffic stop.56 Shortly after stopping a vehicle
for speeding, the officer discovered that none of the four men inside the
vehicle owned or were related to the vehicle’s owner.57 The officer also
claimed to smell marijuana inside the vehicle and observed an envelope on
the floorboard labeled “Supergold.”58 The officer then ordered all four men
to exit the car and placed them under arrest for marijuana possession.59 The
officer searched each individual and opened the envelope to discover
marijuana.60 Thereafter, he read each arrestee their Miranda warnings and
began searching the vehicle, including the passenger compartment.61 In the
back seat of the car, he unzipped the pocket of a black jacket belonging to
Mr. Belton, where the officer claimed to find cocaine.62
At trial, Mr. Belton attempted to suppress the cocaine found inside his
jacket, arguing that it was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.63
When the case reached the Supreme Court, it presented a novel question of
how police should apply the language from Chimel to searches of vehicles
incident to arrest.64 Unlike in Chimel, the Court in Belton began its analysis
with a rather lengthy discussion of the importance of clarity in rules
regulating law enforcement. Quoting from Dunaway v. New York,65 the
Court emphasized that police need “[a] single familiar standard” that can
“guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on
and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstances they confront.”66 In the wake of Chimel, the Court believed
that lower courts had been unable to develop a “workable definition of ‘the
area within the immediate control of the arrestee’” that may be subject to
search without a warrant.67
To create a “workable” solution, the Court held that when a police officer
has lawfully arrested a vehicle occupant, “he may, as a contemporaneous

55. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
56. Id. at 455–56 (describing the circumstances of the traffic stop).
57. Id. at 455.
58. Id. at 455–56.
59. Id. at 456.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (noting that Mr. Belton actually pleaded guilty to a lesser-included offense, but
ultimately preserved his claim that the cocaine was unlawfully seized in violation of the U.S.
Constitution).
64. Id. at 457–58 (citing and quoting Chimel and identifying this case as an extension of
the debate from Chimel).
65. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
66. Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14
(1979)).
67. Id. at 460.
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incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that
automobile.”68 By extension, police can, by default, search jackets or
clothing found inside the vehicle as well. This included Mr. Belton’s
jacket.69
Thus, Belton almost immediately stood for the proposition that, after
arresting an occupant of a car, police have largely unfettered discretion to
conduct warrantless searches of a vehicle—including compartments, bags,
clothing, and other items found inside the vehicle—without violating the
Fourth Amendment. At the time, police departments across the country
widely understood Belton to grant police officers the ability to conduct
automatic vehicle searches incident to traffic arrests.70
C. Arizona v. Gant
In 2009—around three decades after the Court’s holding in Belton—the
Supreme Court again considered the constitutionality of vehicle searches
incident to arrest in Arizona v. Gant.71 In 1999, police in Tucson, Arizona,
received an anonymous tip that a home was being used to sell drugs.72 Two
officers knocked on the front door of the home in question and Rodney Gant
answered.73 Mr. Gant identified himself to the officers and told the officers
that he was not the owner of the home, but that the owner would return later.74
Based on the information the officers received from this conversation, they
discovered that Mr. Gant had an outstanding warrant for a suspended
license.75
When the officers returned later that evening, they observed Mr. Gant pull
into the driveway in a vehicle.76 The officers called to Mr. Gant, who exited
his vehicle and met the officers about ten to twelve feet from his car.77 The
officers then arrested and handcuffed Mr. Gant, and eventually placed him in
the back seat of a patrol car before searching his car.78 Relying on Belton,
the officers believed that such a search was per se permissible because it was
68. Id.
69. Id. at 462–63.
70. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 341 (2009) (“[O]ur opinion [in Belton] has been widely
understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is
no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search.”). In fact,
courts after Belton even went as far as upholding vehicle searches incident to arrest after the
arrestee had left the vehicle at the scene. Id. at 342–43. And the Court noted that “it appears
that the State’s reading of Belton has been widely taught in police academies and that law
enforcement officers have relied on the rule in conducting vehicle searches during the past 28
years.” Id. at 349.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 335.
73. Id. at 335–36.
74. Id. at 336.
75. Id.
76. Id. The officers confirmed Mr. Gant’s identity by shining a light into the vehicle. Id.
77. Id. (noting also that Mr. Gant was initially around thirty feet away from the officers,
who called his name and eventually met him about halfway between the car and their original
location).
78. Id. (detailing how other arrestees at the scene were already similarly confined).
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incident to Mr. Gant’s arrest while he was inside (or near) that vehicle.79 The
officers allegedly found a small plastic bag of cocaine in the pocket of a
jacket on the back seat of his car.80
Mr. Gant faced charges for possession of a narcotic and drug
paraphernalia.81 He challenged the admission of the cocaine evidence,
arguing that it violated the Fourth Amendment.82 When asked why the
officers conducted the search of Mr. Gant’s vehicle incident to his arrest, one
officer responded, “[b]ecause the law says we can do it.”83
Indeed, the Court acknowledged that many courts and police departments
believed that Belton gave officers complete discretion to search anywhere in
a vehicle, incident to the arrest of one of the vehicle’s occupants.84 But most
justices in Gant believed that an expansive reading of Belton “untether[ed]
the rule from the justification underlying the Chimel exception.”85 Instead,
the Court narrowed the widely understood meaning of Belton, holding that
officers may only search vehicles incident to the arrest of an occupant when
justified by one of the original Chimel factors—that is, when necessitated by
an immediate risk to officer safety or the preservation of evidence.86 In the
present case, officer safety could not justify the search of Mr. Gant’s car, as
the police officers on the scene outnumbered the potential suspects.87 Mr.
Gant was not within reaching distance of the car and was handcuffed inside
a patrol car at the time of the search.88 Since Mr. Gant was arrested for a
suspended license, and not for a drug violation, there was no reason police
would “expect to find evidence in the passenger compartment of Gant’s car”
related to this offense.89
Additionally, the Court rejected Arizona’s officer safety arguments, 90 in
part because other available doctrines give police officers the ability to
engage in searches of limited scope during traffic stops to protect officer
well-being.91 So, too, the Court rejected Arizona’s argument that Belton
searches are justified by law enforcement’s need for administratively simple,

79. Id. at 336–37.
80. Id. (noting that one officer also allegedly found a gun).
81. Id.
82. Id. (“Gant argued that Belton did not authorize the search of his vehicle because he
posed no threat to the officers after he was handcuffed in the patrol car and because he was
arrested for a traffic offense for which no evidence could be found in his vehicle.”).
83. Id. at 337.
84. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
85. Gant, 556 U.S. at 343.
86. Id. at 344 (“Because police could not reasonably have believed either that Gant could
have accessed his car at the time of the search or that evidence of the offense for which he was
arrested might have been found therein, the search in this case was unreasonable.”).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 346 (“Contrary to the State’s suggestion, a broad reading of Belton is also
unnecessary to protect law enforcement safety . . . .”).
91. Id. at 347 (“These exceptions together ensure that officers may search a vehicle when
genuine safety or evidentiary concerns encountered during the arrest of a vehicle’s recent
occupant justify a search.”).
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bright-line rules.92 The justices believed that these arguments undervalued
the privacy interests at stake, as Belton gave police “unbridled discretion to
rummage at will among a person’s private effects” inside their vehicle
incident to any arrest inside or near that vehicle.93
Thus, Gant significantly changed the way that police academies trained
officers to conduct searches of vehicles incident to arrest. During the
twenty-eight years after Belton, police academies across the country widely
taught officers that they could search any part of a vehicle if they arrested an
occupant of that vehicle.94 But after Gant, officers had to employ a multipart
test to determine whether officer safety or evidentiary preservation concerns
could justify a search of limited scope within the reaching range of the
arrestee.95
In his lengthy dissenting opinion, Justice Alito argued that the new rule
established in Gant “may endanger arresting officers” and is “virtually
certain to confuse law enforcement officers and judges for some time to
come.”96 Justice Alito worried that the majority misunderstood how police
conduct arrests during traffic stops. Officers normally “handcuff the arrestee
and remove him to a secure place before conducting a search incident to the
arrest.”97 If the ability of an officer to conduct a search of a vehicle incident
to arrest turns on whether he chooses to secure an arrestee before such a
search, then such a rule could “create a perverse incentive for an arresting
officer to prolong the period during which the arrestee is kept in an area
where he could pose a danger to the officer.”98 And more generally, Justice
Alito believed that Gant unjustifiably disrupted precedent relied upon by law
enforcement without adequate justification.99
D. Gant and Pretextual Policing
Although Gant was primarily about the ability of officers to search
vehicles incident to arrest, the effects of the decision should not be
understood in a vacuum. By upending the widely understood rule in
Belton—which most police departments interpreted to permit automatic
searches of an entire vehicle incident to arrest100—the Gant decision may
have also disrupted a common policing tactic of pretextually targeting
suspicious drivers for stops, arrests, and subsequent searches. Before Gant,
the Belton decision, among other overlapping criminal procedure rulings,
92. Id. at 344–47 (acknowledging the arguments in favor of a simple bright-line rule, but
then rejecting them).
93. Id. at 345.
94. Id. at 349 (“[I]t appears that the State’s reading of Belton has been widely taught in
police academies and that law enforcement officers have relied on the rule in conducting
vehicle searches during the past 28 years.”).
95. Id. at 352 (Scalia, J., concurring) (reiterating this two-part test).
96. Id. at 355–56 (Alito, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 362.
98. Id. (quoting United States v. Abdul-Saboor, 85 F.3d 664, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
99. See id. at 358–61 (identifying the importance of law enforcement coming to rely on
Belton and arguing that the new rule is neither justified nor workable).
100. See id. at 349 (majority opinion).
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gave officers the wide-ranging ability to search some vehicles for pretextual
reasons.101 As one group of commentators explained, this was particularly
common among drug interdiction units across the country.102 As they
detailed:
Police have used Belton searches in conjunction with arrests for minor
traffic offenses as a key strategy in ferreting out drugs. Officers observe a
vehicle that they suspect may be involved in drugs. They might have a
hunch, or they may be relying on intelligence about the vehicle. They
follow the vehicle and then establish a pretext for pulling it over, often
relying on minor traffic violations. When officers pull over a vehicle, they
speak with the driver, use their senses to look for any criminal evidence in
plain view, and ask the driver for his license, registration, and proof of
insurance. If the driver is unable to produce any of these three things, an
officer may place him under arrest and may search the vehicle’s passenger
compartment.103

This practice was the result of not just Belton, but the Court’s rulings in
other cases involving police power during traffic stops, including Whren v.
United States104 and Atwater v. Lago Vista.105 In Whren, the Court held that
officers could lawfully conduct pretextual traffic stops.106 That is, as long as
an officer observes at least some objective violation of the traffic code, the
officer may lawfully conduct a traffic stop—even if the actual reason for the
stop is to investigate an officer’s hunch or suspicion that falls short of
reasonable suspicion or probable cause.107 This case originated from a traffic
stop in Washington, D.C., after officers claimed to observe two Black men
101. Indeed, as Professor Wayne A. Logan observed, “the search incident exception [at the
time of Belton] evolved to swallow the rule, so much so that the parameters and rationales
originating the exception are now only vaguely recognizable in many decisions of courts
across the land” and in most cases are now “largely immune to constitutional scrutiny or
control.” Wayne A. Logan, An Exception Swallows a Rule: Police Authority to Search
Incident to Arrest, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 383–84 (2001); see also Seth W. Stoughton,
Modern Police Practices: Arizona v. Gant’s Illusory Restriction of Vehicle Searches Incident
to Arrest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1727, 1728–29 n.9 (2011) (stating that “[c]ritics of vehicle searches
incident to arrest have expressed concern over the way the doctrine incentivizes pretextual
stops and arrests”).
102. Michael C. Gizzi & R. Craig Curtis, The Impact of Arizona v. Gant on Search and
Seizure Law as Applies to Vehicle Searches, 1 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 30, 30–31 (2011)
(“Although difficult to quantify, law enforcement agents find evidence supporting drug arrests
through this process often enough to create a general perception among officers that this is a
highly effective tactic for drug interdiction.”).
103. Id. at 30; see also Stoughton, supra note 101, at 1728 n.9 (also identifying the
combination of Whren, Atwater, and Belton as potentially granting wide authority to police
officers to engage in searches incident to arrest pre-Gant, and stating “[u]nder this line of
cases, an officer who arrested any vehicle occupant for any offense—even a pretextual
arrest—was authorized to search the vehicle incident to arrest”).
104. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
105. 532 U.S. 318 (2000).
106. Whren, 517 U.S. at 809, 819 (“Here the District Court found that the officers had
probable cause to believe that petitioners had violated the traffic code . . . [which] rendered
the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment . . . .”).
107. Id. at 813 (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis.”).
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sitting at a stop sign for “more than twenty seconds” before the driver
allegedly looked at the lap of another passenger.108 When the officers made
a U-turn to investigate further, they claimed the vehicle suddenly turned
without signaling and began driving at high speed.109 The officers used this
as their objective basis for the traffic stop.110 The evidence suggested that
the officers, who were assigned to patrol a “high drug area,” actually decided
to stop the car because of a hunch that the occupants of the vehicle were
involved in other types of criminal behavior.111 When the officers
approached the car, they claimed to see two large plastic bags of crack
cocaine in the hands one of the car’s passengers, Michael Whren.112 Officers
arrested both Mr. Whren and the driver, James L. Brown.113
Mr. Whren and Mr. Brown attempted to suppress the drug evidence
obtained during the stop by arguing that the officers’ justification for the
traffic stop was impermissibly pretextual, constituting a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.114 They argued that if officers were allowed to stop
individuals for pretextual reasons, they could follow any driver long enough
to eventually find some “technical violation” that could justify a traffic
stop.115 And this kind of discretionary power, they argued, would result in
some officers stopping motorists for “decidedly impermissible factors,” such
as the race of the driver or the passengers.116
In a unanimous decision, the Court rejected Mr. Whren’s concerns,
holding that pretextual stops do not violate the Fourth Amendment.117 If a
police officer can identify some objective violation of the traffic code, the
officer may conduct a vehicle stop, even if the officer is primarily interested
in using that stop to investigate a hunch or suspicion that, by itself, does not
rise to the level of probable cause or reasonable suspicion.118
Scholars widely criticized Whren, arguing that police officers were more
likely to target racial minorities for pretextual stops than white drivers.119
108. Id. at 808.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 808–10.
112. Id. at 809.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 810.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 807, 819.
118. Id. at 812–13.
119. Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional: Racial
Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882,
884 & n.2, 886 (2015) (providing a list of existing studies at the time that argued that Whren
had contributed to or legitimated racial profiling by law enforcement); see also Tracey Maclin,
Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 344–54 (1998) (linking pretextual
stops and racial profiling); Phyllis W. Beck & Patricia A. Daly, State Constitutional Analysis
of Pretext Stops: Racial Profiling and Public Policy Concerns, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 597, 597
(1999) (“The primary concern with pretext stops is that they facilitate racial profiling, the
process of singling out drivers based on their race.”); Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I.
Edelstein, Pretext Stops and Racial Profiling After Whren v. United States: The New York
and New Jersey Responses Compared, 63 ALB. L. REV. 725, 726 (2000) (“[T]he Whren Court
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Professor David A. Harris described the decision as “profoundly dangerous”
and predicted that police would “use the traffic code to stop a hugely
disproportionate number of African-Americans and Hispanics.”120 Professor
I. Bennett Capers wrote that Whren “essentially green-lighted the police
practice of singling out minorities for pretextual traffic stops in the hope of
discovering contraband” because Whren allowed police to “use race as an
‘unofficial’ proxy for suspicion.”121 Professor David A. Sklansky argued
that the justices in Whren illustrated a “disregard for the distinctive concerns
of racial minorities.”122 And Professor Devon W. Carbado claimed that after
Whren, “racial profiling claims are not constitutionally cognizable” under the
Fourth Amendment because “race matters in the Fourth Amendment context
only to the extent that a police officer’s conduct is overtly racially
coercive.”123
Additionally, after an officer conducts a pretextual stop pursuant to Whren,
the U.S. Constitution permits officers to arrest the driver for any criminal
offense, including traffic violations in some cases—even if the arresting
offense is not one that ordinarily could lead to imprisonment under state law.
This holding came from the Court’s controversial ruling in Atwater.124 In
that case, a police officer in Lago Vista, Texas, conducted a routine traffic
stop involving Gail Atwater and her two children.125 The officer observed
Ms. Atwater’s three-year-old and five-year-old children sitting in the front
seat of her pickup truck without seatbelts.126 As the officer approached the
truck, he yelled “[w]e’ve met before” and “[y]ou’re going to jail.”127 The
officer then handcuffed Ms. Atwater, “drove her to the local police station,
where booking officers had her remove her shoes, jewelry, and eyeglasses,
and empty her pockets.”128 Officers at the station took a mug shot of Ms.
Atwater and placed her in a jail cell for one hour before she appeared before
a magistrate judge.129 The judge ordered her released on $310 bond.130 Ms.
Atwater faced charges for driving without a seatbelt, failing to secure her
children, driving without a license, and failure to provide the officer with her

validated one of the most common methods by which racial profiles are put into effect—the
pretext stop.”).
120. David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme
Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 545–46 (1997).
121. I. Bennett Capers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the
Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2011).
122. David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth
Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 274, 278–79.
123. Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 1033,
1044 (2002).
124. Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 318 (2000).
125. Id. at 323–24.
126. Id. at 324 (noting that the observation of the children not wearing their seatbelts was
apparently the violation that justified the traffic stop).
127. Id.
128. Id. (providing further details about the handling of the children during the arrest and
booking).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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insurance documentation.131
Under Texas law, the offenses are
misdemeanors punishable by mere fines and no imprisonment.132
Ms. Atwater filed a civil rights suit against the officer and the municipality,
arguing that her arrest violated the Fourth Amendment.133 She argued that it
constituted an unreasonable seizure to arrest an individual for an offense that
is not punishable by imprisonment under state law.134 In a 5–4 decision, the
Court held that officers are permitted to arrest individuals without a warrant
for minor misdemeanor offenses, including those that can only result in
fines.135 And of course, if an officer exercises their discretion to conduct
such an arrest, under Belton, the officer also has broad discretion to conduct
a search of that vehicle incident to that arrest.136
Thus, after Whren, Atwater, and Belton, it seems theoretically plausible
that officers could use then-existing criminal procedure rules to pretextually
justify stops, arrests, and vehicle searches of suspects they found suspicious.
In fact, there is reason to believe that Mr. Gant himself may have been a
victim of this confluence of criminal procedure rules. There was evidence
that the officers in Gant knew how to navigate the then-existing rules to
justify otherwise unlawful searches. Remember, in that case, the officers
suspected Mr. Gant of being part of a drug operation.137 Only after speaking
with Mr. Gant inside a suspected drug house did the officers discover Mr.
Gant’s outstanding warrant.138 The officers could have arrested Mr. Gant in
numerous different ways, yet they waited until he had just stepped out of his
car.139 They then elected to arrest Mr. Gant for a suspended license offense
and used his proximity to the car to justify a search of his vehicle.140 There
was no reason for the officers to fear for their safety, nor was there any reason
to believe that the officers would uncover evidence related to the suspended
license offense that served as the basis for the warrant. And as noted above,
one officer candidly acknowledged at trial that the officers chose to arrest
Mr. Gant in this manner and to conduct a search of his vehicle because they
understood the law to allow them such a search.141
Affording such wide discretion to officers may result in greater harms to
individuals of color than white individuals, as prior research has shown that
officers are more likely to be suspicious of individuals of color, due in part
131. Id. (noting that all but the seatbelt violation was dismissed, and Ms. Atwater ultimately
merely paid a fifty-dollar fine).
132. Id. at 323 (citing and discussing these Texas laws at the beginning of the majority
opinion; also noting that Texas law still expressly permits officers to arrest individuals for
these offenses).
133. Id. at 325.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 354 (“Atwater’s arrest satisfied constitutional requirements.”).
136. See supra Part II.B (discussing the Belton decision).
137. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335–36 (2009) (describing how the officers were
responding to a tip about drug sales at the house).
138. Id. at 336.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 337 (noting that when asked why they chose to search Mr. Gant’s car, the
officer answered, “[b]ecause the law says we can do it.”).

18

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

to implicit bias.142 All of this suggests that by curtailing police power to
engage in searches incident to arrest, the Gant decision may have not just
reduced the frequency of vehicle searches. The decision may have also
reduced officer incentives to engage in pretextual stops and arrests as well.
If an officer is unable to search a suspect’s vehicle automatically incident to
an arrest, then such pretextual stops and arrests may be more trouble than
they are worth.
As a result, this Article will examine not just the effect of Gant on searches
incident to arrest, but also on earlier actions by law enforcement, including
stops and arrests. It may be that by removing the opportunity to conduct a
search of a vehicle, the Gant decision also reduced the incentive for police to
target drivers for both pretextual stops (under Whren) and pretextual arrests
(under Atwater). And since prior empirical evidence has tied these pretextual
policing tactics to patterns of possible racial profiling, 143 this Article also
considers whether the effects of Gant were experienced differently across
racial groups, as explained in Parts II and III.
E. Existing Literature and Reactions to Gant
Leading up to the Gant decision, twenty-five states, the National
Association of Police Organizations, the International Association of Chiefs
of Police, the National Sheriff’s Association, and other law enforcement
groups filed amicus briefs urging the Court to maintain Belton’s bright-line
rule to protect officer safety.144 Meanwhile, defense and civil liberties
organizations urged the Court to “curb the widespread police practice of
using traffic arrests as pretexts for conducting ‘purely exploratory
searches.’”145 Members of the defense bar celebrated the Gant decision,
while policing officials lamented how the decision “took a tool we’ve had for
25 years and removed it from our toolbox.”146

142. See, e.g., L. Song Richardson, Implicit Racial Bias and Racial Anxiety: Implications
for Stops and Frisks, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 73, 75–81 (2017) (documenting some of the
existing literature on this subject matter).
143. See generally Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, An Empirical Assessment of
Pretextual Stops and Racial Profiling, 73 STAN. L. REV. 637 (2021) (finding that the Arreola
decision in Washington, which granted officers the ability to engage in stops akin to pretextual
stops, was associated with an uptick in stops of nonwhite drivers relative to white drivers).
144. See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Arizona v. Gant: Does It Matter?, 2009 SUP. CT. REV.
275, 278 n.19 (citing these briefs).
145. Id. at 278 (quoting Brief for Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers in Support of Respondent at 8–11, Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009)
(No. 07-542)).
146. Id. at 279 (quoting Brian Smith, Local Opinions Mixed on Vehicle Search Decisions,
RICHMOND REG. (May 2, 2009), https://www.richmondregister.com/news/local_news/localopinions-mixed-on-vehicle-search-decision/article_090db52e-cd1c-53c9-a2ec9a3ca764e29c.html [https://perma.cc/4WFT-X8VS]).
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Numerous scholars wrote about the implications of the Gant decision for
policing.147 Some argued that Gant increased doctrinal confusion,148 while
others supported the decision.149 Some empirical research has found that
police executive knowledge of the doctrinal requirements of Gant and
training on its holding have been uneven and inconsistent, raising questions
about whether departments would fully comply with the rule.150 A slew of
student comments and notes discussed the efficacy of the decision.151
Professor Seth W. Stoughton predicted that Gant may not significantly
constrain police searches because of the availability of alternative
justifications and the relative expansiveness of the new two-part Gant test.152
Professor Frank Rudy Cooper argued that Gant may not have done enough
to address how pretextual stops could still facilitate racial profiling.153
Less common in the scholarly literature, though, are empirical assessments
of the effects of Gant.154 One prior empirical study by Professors Ethan D.
Boldt and Michael C. Gizzi attempted to evaluate the effects of Gant on
police behavior by using time series intervention analysis and traffic data
from two states.155 They found some evidence that police may be turning to
alternative means to circumvent the more restrictive rule established by
147. See generally Armacost, supra note 144 (offering a range of predictions of how Gant
may influence police behavior).
148. See generally George M. Dery II, A Case of Doubtful Certainty: The Court Relapses
into Search Incident to Arrest Confusion in Arizona v. Gant, 44 IND. L. REV. 395 (2011)
(worrying about the uncertainty created by the Gant decision).
149. See generally Michael Goodin, Arizona v. Gant: The Supreme Court Gets It Right
(Almost), 87 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 114 (2010) (expressing only minor reservations and
general agreement with the Court’s decision); Myron Moskovitz, The Road to Reason:
Arizona v. Gant and the Search Incident to Arrest Doctrine, 79 MISS. L.J. 181 (2009)
(generally supporting the Court’s doctrinal shift in Gant).
150. See generally Christopher Totten & Sutham Cobkit, Police Vehicle Searches Incident
to Arrest: Evaluating Chiefs’ Knowledge of Arizona v. Gant, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 257
(2017); James A. Purdon, Henry F. Fradella, Christopher D. Totten & Gang Lee, Police
Officers’ Knowledge of Gant, 24 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 468 (2021) (finding that although the
overwhelming majority of officers received training in Gant, many applied it incorrectly in
practice).
151. See, e.g., Jason Hermele, Comment, Arizona v. Gant:
Rethinking the
Evidence-Gathering Justification for the Search Incident to Arrest Exception, and Testing a
New Approach, 87 DENV. L. REV. 175 (2009); Jeffrey R. Beck, Note, Arizona v. Gant:
Heightening a Person’s Expectation to Privacy in a Motor Vehicle Following Search Incident
to Arrest, 55 S.D. L. REV. 299 (2010); Jacob R. Brown, Comment, Arrested Development:
Arizona v. Gant and Article I, Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution, 85 WASH. L.
REV. 355 (2010); Justin Casson, Comment, Arizona v. Gant: Just Another Speed Bump?, 45
GONZ. L. REV. 797 (2010); Jack Blum, Note, Arizona v. Gant: Missing an Opportunity to
Banish Bright Lines from the Court’s Vehicular Search Incident to Arrest Jurisprudence, 70
MD. L. REV. 826 (2011); Anthony M. Ruiz, Note, Defining Gant’s Reach: The Search Incident
to Arrest Doctrine After Arizona v. Gant, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337 (2014).
152. Stoughton, supra note 101.
153. See generally Frank Rudy Cooper, Post-Racialism and Searches Incident to Arrest,
44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113 (2012).
154. At least one empirical study evaluated police deployment of the Belton doctrine,
pre-Gant. See Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason: An Empirical Reexamination
of Chimel and Belton, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 657, 674–76.
155. Ethan D. Boldt & Michael C. Gizzi, The Implementation of Supreme Court Precedent:
The Impact of Arizona v. Gant, 6 J.L. & CTS. 355 (2018).
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Gant.156 But this does not foreclose the need for additional research. Our
study builds on Boldt and Gizzi’s important findings in several ways. First,
we take advantage of the expansive Stanford Open Policing Project database
to evaluate the effect of Gant across multiple states and agencies. Second,
our Article tests many of the doctrinal assumptions underlying the debate in
Gant, including the effect of Gant on officer safety. Third, our Article
explores the differential effect of Gant on drivers of color relative to white
drivers. As we explain more in Part IV, we believe that the disparate impact
of seemingly neutral procedural decisions like Gant on racial minorities have
received less attention by many courts and scholars. Finally, this Article uses
a different methodological approach—difference-in-differences and triple
difference frameworks—to assess Gant’s impact on police behavior and
officer safety. We also take advantage of jurisdictional variation in state laws
on vehicle searches incident to arrest, rather than relying on time series
analysis. In these ways, our Article builds on prior work and contributes to
the literature on policing.
II. METHODOLOGY
This Article utilizes a data set of millions of traffic stops to analyze how
jurisdictional variations in judicial doctrines on vehicle searches incident to
arrest influence police behavior. It also examines the effect of these decisions
on officer safety. Until recently, much of this type of research was not
possible due to limited traffic stop data. But emerging data sets, like the
Stanford Open Policing Project data set157 used in this Article, allow
researchers to take advantage of jurisdictional variation to test many of the
assumptions underlying criminal procedure doctrines. Part II describes our
methodology. Part II.A explores the variation in state approaches to vehicle
searches incident to arrest. This jurisdictional variation allows us to compare
states that followed Belton and Gant with states that adopted different
doctrinal approaches. Part II.B describes the data set used in this Article.
Part II.C presents our methodological choices and models.
A. Jurisdictional Variation
Although the shift from Belton to Gant was a significant change for much
of the country, some states had already made similar alterations in state law
between 1981 and 2009. The National Association of Federal Defenders
(NAFD) filed an amicus brief in the Gant litigation discussing this
jurisdictional variation in detail. Figure 1 visually illustrates the progression
of state court decisions, as documented by the NAFD brief in Gant, that
established more restrictive rules on searches of vehicles incident to arrest.
Many of these cases established rules like the Supreme Court did in Gant in
2009. Thus, although most police departments in the country between 1981
and 2009 trained officers that they could lawfully search anywhere in a
156. Id.
157. See STANFORD OPEN POLICING PROJECT, supra note 22.
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vehicle incident to the arrest of a vehicle occupant under Belton, officers in
these states were limited at various points by a more restrictive doctrine.
Figure 1: Timeline of State Departures from Belton Rules158
Belton (1981)

Gant (2009)
Wyoming (1990)

Oregon (1984)

New Mexico (1997)

New Jersey (2006)

New York (1989)
Massachusetts (1983)

Vermont (2007)
Pennsylvania (1995)
Nevada (2003)

For example, one apparent deviation from Belton came in 1983 in
Commonwealth v. Toole,159 where the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
held that police officers could not automatically search a vehicle incident to
the arrest of a former occupant of that vehicle.160 The case originated out of
a 1981 traffic stop that culminated in the arrest of Richard Toole for an
outstanding assault and battery warrant.161 After handcuffing Mr. Toole and
placing him in a squad car with two state troopers, another trooper searched
his vehicle.162 That officer found a .45-caliber weapon behind one of the
seats.163 Mr. Toole ultimately faced charges for unlawfully carrying a

158. In constructing this timeline, we rely primarily on the amicus brief filed by the
National Association of Federal Defenders in Arizona v. Gant. See Brief of the National
Association of Federal Defenders as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra note 17,
at 8–9 n.2. This brief relied on the years in which the state courts in each jurisdiction explicitly
rejected automatic search doctrines for vehicles incident to arrest. In some cases, the rejection
of automatic vehicle searches incident to arrest occurred more gradually over time. The years
listed above represent the years by which the National Association of Federal Defenders
considered the doctrinal trend clearly established in these states.
159. 448 N.E.2d 1264 (Mass. 1983).
160. Id. at 1266–67. This case receives particular discussion here because it serves as the
basis of our empirical study in this Article. It is also significant because, unlike in some
jurisdictions mentioned in Figure 1 that experienced somewhat more gradual shifts in
doctrines, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued a relatively unambiguous rule in
Toole that closely mirrored the U.S. Supreme Court’s later ruling in Gant.
161. Id. at 1265–66.
162. Id. at 1266 (noting that this happened after the officers ordered the defendant out of
the cab and conducted a “routine ‘pat-frisk’” that allegedly found “an empty holster and an
ammunition clip containing .45 caliber bullets”).
163. Id. (noting that the defendant told the officers that he did not have a firearms
identification card).

22

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

firearm.164 At trial, the defendant attempted to suppress the firearm, arguing
that police came across the weapon pursuant to an unlawful search.165
On appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the
officer’s search of Mr. Toole’s vehicle violated his rights under
Massachusetts law.166 In 1974, the legislature in Massachusetts had adopted
a more restrictive law on officer searches incident to arrest than that required
by the U.S. Supreme Court under the Fourth Amendment.167 The 1974
amendment to state law essentially codified the principles expressed in
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s dissent in United States v. Robinson.168 On this
basis, the court held that Massachusetts police officers could not rely
exclusively on the Belton rule to justify any vehicle searches incident to arrest
of one of the vehicle’s occupants; instead, officers needed to find some other
“constitutionally acceptable basis for the search.”169 Thus, in the years after
Belton, when most officers across the country were being trained to search
vehicles incident to arrest at-will, the courts in Massachusetts more strictly
regulated this tactic.

164. Id.
165. Procedurally, the lower court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress, the state
appealed, and the issue was then presented to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. See
id.
166. Id. (“We affirm the order allowing the defendant’s motion to suppress the gun.”).
167. Id. at 1266 n.3 (describing the history of Massachusetts General Law, chapter 276,
section 1). That state law provides:
A search conducted incident to an arrest may be made only for the purposes of
seizing fruits, instrumentalities, contraband and other evidence of the crime for
which the arrest has been made, in order to prevent its destruction or concealment;
and removing any weapons that the arrestee might use to resist arrest or effect his
escape. Property seized as a result of a search in violation of the provisions of this
paragraph shall not be admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 1 (2022).
168. 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Toole, 448 N.E.2d at 1267 (“The 1974 amendment of § 1 adopts
the principles expressed in the dissent in the Robinson case regarding the proper scope of a
search incident to arrest.”).
169. Toole, 448 N.E.2d at 1268.
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In the years that followed, New York,170 Wyoming,171 Pennsylvania,172
New Mexico,173 Nevada,174 New Jersey,175 and Vermont176 all handed down
rulings at the state level articulating principles that appeared to be more
restrictive than the Belton test for searches incident to arrest.177 As explained
below, this jurisdictional variation allows us to employ various statistical
methods to estimate the effect of Gant on police behavior and safety.
B. Data Sets
This Article relies on two data sets. First, to analyze the effect of Gant and
Gant-like state equivalents on officer safety, we use the Law Enforcement
Officer Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) Data Collection.178 This database,
updated annually by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, documents
“felonious deaths, accidental deaths, and assaults of duly sworn city,
university and college, county, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement
officers.”179 This database provides reasonably reliable estimates of police
officer deaths and injuries in the line of duty over time across the many
American police departments. Because the data are broken down by
jurisdiction, we can compare officer assaults in jurisdictions that adopted
Belton-like rules with jurisdictions that adopted Gant-like rules. Prior studies
examining officer safety have used LEOKA data.180
Second, to explore the effects of these shifting doctrinal rules on officer
conduct during traffic stops, we rely on the recently released Stanford Open

170. See People v. Blasich, 541 N.E.2d 40 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that police may not
automatically search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a person inside the vehicle; instead,
officers must identify another applicable exception to conduct warrantless searches, or
otherwise have probable cause).
171. See Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476 (Wyo. 1990) (upholding a relatively narrow rule
that requires that vehicle searches be reasonable because of a concern for officer or public
safety).
172. See Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1995) (holding that, absent exigent
circumstances, a police officer may not automatically search a vehicle incident to the arrest of
a vehicle occupant).
173. See State v. Arredondo, 944 P.2d 276 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (reaffirming that
bright-line rules permitting automatic vehicle searches incident to arrest violated the New
Mexico Constitution).
174. See Camacho v. State, 75 P.3d 370 (Nev. 2003) (finding that it violated the Nevada
Constitution to conduct a warrantless vehicle search incident to arrest without probable cause
or exigent circumstances).
175. See State v. Eckel, 888 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 2006) (reaching a conclusion similar to that
in the later Gant decision and finding that a vehicle search incident to the arrest of an occupant
may only be justified on safety or evidentiary grounds).
176. See State v. Bauder, 924 A.2d 38 (Vt. 2007) (reaching a similar conclusion to that in
the later Gant decision).
177. We rely on the states and case years identified by the National Association of Federal
Defenders in their amicus brief. Brief of the National Association of Federal Defenders as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra note 17.
178. Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, supra note 23.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Woods, supra note 30, at 646–54 (explaining the use of this statistical
database).
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Policing Project database.181 Several recent empirical studies have relied on
this data in analyzing police traffic stop behavior.182 Only around
eighty-eight state and local law enforcement agencies had provided data to
the researchers at Stanford at the time of this Article’s publication. Of these,
thirty-one agencies had reported whether traffic stops resulted in arrests or
searches. And of those thirty-one agencies reporting sufficient data, thirteen
of them had reported this data both before and after the Gant decision.
These include the Maryland state patrol,183 Massachusetts state patrol,184
the Montana state patrol,185 the Rhode Island state patrol,186 the San
Francisco Police Department,187 the South Carolina state patrol,188 and
numerous police departments in North Carolina, including the Charlotte
police department,189 the Durham Police Department,190 the Fayetteville
Police Department,191 the Greensboro Police Department,192 the Raleigh
Police Department,193 the Winston-Salem Police Department,194 and the
North Carolina state patrol.195 Of these agencies, twelve appeared to follow
the Belton rule on vehicle searches incident to arrest before 2009, while one
of them (the Massachusetts state patrol) followed its state’s more restrictive
rule that mirrored Gant. Then from 2009 onward, all thirteen of these
agencies followed Gant or Gant-like limitations on vehicle searches incident
to arrest.
In most cases, the Stanford Open Policing Project data sets include other
variables, such as the time of the stop, the driver’s race, the driver’s sex, the
driver’s age, the presence of contraband, whether the officer issued a citation,
whether the officer conducted a frisk, the stated reason for the traffic stop,
and the stated violation.196 In total, the merged data sets from these thirteen
181. STANFORD OPEN POLICING PROJECT, supra note 22 (click on “data” and scroll to each
respective jurisdictional database).
182. See, e.g., Pierson et al., supra note 22, at 736 (describing the data set and using it to
examine broad patterns of racial disparities in traffic stops across the United States); Rushin
& Edwards, supra note 143, at 667–73 (describing the use of this data set to examine the
relationship between doctrines on pretextual traffic stops in Washington and the number of
stops of nonwhite drivers relative to white drivers).
183. STANFORD OPEN POLICING PROJECT, supra note 22 (containing 3,587,052 stops in this
data set from December 2006 to March 2014).
184. Id. (containing 3,416,238 stops in this data set from December 2006 to December
2015).
185. Id. (containing 825,107 stops in this data set from December 2008 to December 2016).
186. Id. (containing 509,671 stops in this data set from January 2005 to December 2015).
187. Id. (containing 905,070 stops in this data set from December 2006 to June 2016).
188. Id. (containing 8,983,807 stops in this data set from December 2004 to December
2016).
189. Id. (containing 1,598,453 stops in this data set from December 1999 to December
2015).
190. Id. (containing 326,024 stops in this data set from December 2001 to December 2015).
191. Id. (containing 486,998 stops in this data set from January 2000 to December 2015).
192. Id. (containing 600,031 stops in this data set from January 2000 to December 2015).
193. Id. (containing 856,400 stops in this data set from December 2001 to December 2015).
194. Id. (containing 452,560 stops in this data set from January 2000 to December 2015).
195. Id. (containing 20,286,645 stops in this data set from December 1999 to December
2015).
196. Id.
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agencies document around forty-two million stops that occurred between
1999 and 2016.197
One immediate challenge that we face in using this data set is the definition
of “search” used by jurisdictions across the country. Some jurisdictions
provide details on the circumstances or justification for searches, including
“inventory,” “probable cause,” “other,” or “plain view.” Other jurisdictions
group together these searches into a single, catchall category (normally
labeled “search”).198 Some jurisdictions also break out the data to include
additional types of privacy invasions like frisks of persons.199 Given that we
use data from multiple jurisdictions—some that provide this context, and
some that do not—we run our analyses using the common “search” variable
found in each jurisdiction’s database. We recognize that this will be
overinclusive in some circumstances. For some jurisdictions, this will cover
searches that are not traditional vehicle searches incident to arrest justified
under Belton or Gant. This is an unavoidable limitation of the available data.
Nevertheless, our study overcomes this challenge because we employ
difference-in-differences and triple-difference frameworks. Whatever the
varied definition of “search” used by individual jurisdictions, we think it is
unlikely these definitions changed over time. So long as each agency’s
internal “search” definition remained the same throughout our time period
(before and after Gant in 2009), the results should not be biased. Still, we
recommend readers understand this limitation in the available data and avoid
making definitive causal conclusions based on our findings. Although our
findings can demonstrate correlation and facilitate theory building, our
findings cannot demonstrate a definitive, causal connection between Gant or
Gant-like state rules and subsequent changes in officer behavior.
C. Models
To measure the effect of Gant on officer assaults, we take advantage of the
jurisdictional variation in doctrines on vehicle searches incident to arrest
identified in Figure 1.200 The LEOKA database generally identifies the
circumstances surrounding officer assaults. We are primarily interested in
officer assaults that occurred during a “traffic pursuit or stop.” Traffic
assaults are thankfully rare. Between 1985 and 2015, 4 percent of the
state-year observations report no traffic assaults, and around 21 percent of
the state-year observations201 report fewer than 15 traffic assaults per state

197. The merged data set covers approximately 42,834,056 traffic stops in total.
198. Amy Shoemaker, Johann Gaebler & Daniel Jenson, Open Policing Project, GITHUB
(Jan. 7, 2021), https://github.com/stanford-policylab/opp/blob/master/data_readme.md
[https://perma.cc/K9QG-BJJ4].
199. Id.
200. We conduct this analysis from 1985 onward because of limited data availability.
201. This data is organized as a panel series data set meaning that we follow states across
time. As such, the smallest unit of measure is any given state in any given year. We define
this unit of measure as state-year observations.
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per year.202
The frequency of zero outcomes, coupled with the
noncontinuous nature of the outcome variable (all numbers are truncated at
zero because there cannot be a negative number of assaults, nor can there be
0.5 assaults), presents some challenges to our estimation strategy. There are
multiple ways to address this challenge. Ultimately, we estimate all feasible
methods and report most of them with the same conclusion. The baseline
model attempts to explain state-year to state-year variation in officer traffic
assaults by changes to laws on vehicle searches incident to arrest. Formally,
this model looks similar to other difference-in-differences regressions:
Okt =α+φGantt +Xt +Yk +ε
where the outcome, O, is measured in state, k, at time, t. Gant is a dummy
variable that flags if the state-year observation is subject to a Gant-like rule;
Xt is a vector of year dummy variables that vary by time, t; and Yk is a vector
of state dummy variables that vary by state, k. The primary challenge is
exactly how to model the outcome—officer traffic assaults. One approach is
to include the number of officer traffic assaults per state per year as the
outcome and use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to estimate 𝜑. Although this
way is the most straightforward, OLS assumes a continuous and normally
distributed outcome variable—both conditions which are likely violated in
this context. Even if not, if we were to evaluate count data, this may skew
the data given that we look at multiple jurisdictions of widely varied sizes.
For instance, an increase of fifteen assaults in a sparsely populated state like
Wyoming means something very different than an increase of fifteen assaults
in a highly populated state like California. To adjust for population, we also
scale the outcome variable by population and, alternatively, by the total
number of overall assaults of officers. This addresses comparability across
states but does not address the OLS assumption of normality in the outcome.
To address this, we also take the natural log of the assault per capita rate and
the traffic assaults per total assaults rate. Additionally, we report each of
these iterations with and without population weights, though recent research
recommends not weighting.203 Lastly, we also model the officer traffic
assaults with Poisson regression techniques that can handle count data.
Next, we evaluate the effects of Gant on traffic enforcement behaviors by
police officers. Given the nature and limitations of the data, there are a
number of issues that require careful consideration for empirically estimating
the effect Gant has had on officer-driver interactions. Standard empirical
estimation in policing issues typically exploits jurisdictional variation in

202. Jacob Kaplan, Jacob Kaplan’s Concatenated Files: Uniform Crime Reporting
Program Data: Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) 1960–2020,
OPENICPSR, https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/102180/version/V11/view (Sept.
22, 2021) [https://perma.cc/PYY6-NKJD].
203. See Steven N. Durlauf, Salvador Navarro & David A. Rivers, Model Uncertainty and
the Effect of Shall-Issue Right-to-Carry Laws on Crime, 81 EUR. ECON. REV. 32, 34 (2016)
(finding minimal support for the need for population weights).
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policy or law.204 In doing so, difference-in-differences frameworks compare
two groups: a jurisdiction that experienced a change in the policy (the
“treatment” group) to a jurisdiction where that policy was unchanged over
the same time period (the “control” group).205
Typically, the treatment group experiences some policy shift that the
control group does not. In the present case, though, we are limited in the
kind of control group we can construct from the traffic stop data available
through the Stanford Open Policing Project database. As described in Part
II.B, we identified twelve jurisdictions in the Stanford Open Policing Project
database where the Gant decision altered state laws on searches incident to
arrest.206 We use these twelve jurisdictions as our treatment group. We were
only able to identify one agency—the Massachusetts state patrol—where the
state rules on searches incident to arrest were largely unchanged by Gant,207
and data is available from both before and after the Gant decision (December
2006 through December 2015). This is because, in 1983, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court departed from the Belton decision in Toole by
limiting vehicle searches incident to arrest to circumstances where safety or
evidentiary preservation necessitated it.208 So throughout the time period
covered by the Stanford Open Policing Project database, Massachusetts used
a rule similar to Gant that was largely kept intact. As such, Massachusetts
provides the only baseline comparison or control group that we can use for
our difference-in-differences framework.
It is less than ideal to have a single jurisdiction, even a large agency like
the Massachusetts state patrol, as our control group. Ideally, we would have
multiple agencies contributing to the control group to provide an accurate
204. See, e.g., Richard Rosenfeld, Michael J. Deckard & Emily Blackburn, The Effects of
Directed Patrol and Self-Initiated Enforcement on Firearm Violence: A Randomized
Controlled Study of Hot Spot Policing, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 428, 434, 439–43 (2014) (relying on
difference-in-differences to estimate the effect of hot spot policing tactics); Rushin &
Edwards, supra note 143, at 683–85 (describing another use of difference-in-differences to
evaluate the effect of a change in law on police behavior).
205. Marianne Bertrand, Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan, How Much Should We
Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?, 119 Q.J. ECON. 249, 250 (2004) (stating that this
methodology is particularly useful when interventions are the equivalent of “random,
conditional on time and group fixed effects” but also acknowledging concerns about
endogeneity). For more examples of difference-in-differences estimation strategies, see
generally John J. Donohue, Guns, Crime, and the Impact of State Right-to-Carry Laws, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 623 (2004); Justin Wolfers, Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce
Rates?: A Reconciliation and New Results, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 1802 (2006); Griffin Edwards,
Doing Their Duty: An Empirical Analysis of the Unintended Effect of Tarasoff v. Regents on
Homicidal Activity, 57 J.L. & ECON. 321 (2014). For a brief literature review on the use of
difference-in-differences estimation, see Michael Lechner, The Estimation of Causal Effects
by Difference-in-Difference Methods, 4 FOUNDS. & TRENDS ECONOMETRICS 165, 168–69
(2010). See also Elizabeth A. Stuart, Haiden A. Huskamp, Kenneth Duckworth, Jeffrey
Simmons, Zirui Song, Michael E. Chernew & Colleen L. Barry, Using Propensity Scores in
Difference-in-Differences Models to Estimate the Effects of a Policy Change, 14 HEALTH
SERVS. & OUTCOMES RSCH. METHODOLOGY 166, 167 (2014) (describing how social scientists
have used this methodology to evaluate the effects of legal changes).
206. See infra Part III.A (particularly Figure 1).
207. See infra Part III.A (describing the Toole decision).
208. See infra Part III.A.
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depiction of baseline traffic behavior. This is an unfortunate limitation of
our methodology necessitated by the lack of jurisdictional variation and
traffic data. Nonetheless, Massachusetts does allow us at least a first pass at
a difference-in-differences estimate.
In its most basic form, the
difference-in-differences approach is formalized through a multiple
regression framework as the following equation:
Okt =α+∂affected statesk +φpost Gantt +βaffected states*post Gantkt +ε
where the outcome, O, is measured in region, k, at time, t. Affected states is
a dummy variable that varies by region and that flags the groups that were
subjected to the Gant ruling that did not previously have a similar law. The
variable post Gant is a time dummy variable that flags all observations that
occurred after the time at which Gant was decided, and varies by time, t. And
the difference-in-differences estimate, 𝛽, is the interaction between those two
variables. This compares traffic behavior in Gant regions after Gant to
before, and then compares that same difference to Massachusetts before and
after Gant. Note that in this specification there is no designation between
race, as all outcomes are aggregated together. That is, if there were a
differential effect between white and nonwhite drivers, this estimation would
mask that effect. We use this model to estimate the effects of Gant on the
number of traffic stops, arrests, searches, searches that co-occur with arrests,
and on the collection of contraband during a traffic stop.
Next, we recognize that Belton may have incentivized pretextual policing
that disproportionately impacted individuals of color.209 As a result, the
effects of Gant’s rollback of the Belton rule may have resulted in a larger
shift in police behavior against individuals of color relative to white
individuals. To test this hypothesis, we employ multiple approaches. To
begin, we use a difference-in-differences framework that includes only the
twelve available jurisdictions that followed Belton until they were forced to
adopt the Gant rule in 2009. In this model, white drivers serve as the control
group (akin to the Massachusetts state patrol in the previous model), with
nonwhite drivers receiving the treatment. Formally, it would look very
similar:
Oikt =α+∂nonwhitei +φpost Gantt +βnonwhitei *post Gantit +ε
where the outcome, O, is measured by race, i, in county, k, at time, t. The
variable nonwhite is a dummy variable that flags the observations that
measure the count of nonwhite traffic stops. The variable post Gant is the
same as before. And again, the difference-in-differences estimate, 𝛽, is the
interaction between those two variables. This approach is attractive in that it
does not require reliance on a single state as a control group. And arguably,
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gant may have served as an unexpected
209. See supra Part II.B (discussing the interaction between Belton, Whren, and Atwater).
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shift in doctrine sufficient to avoid endogeneity concerns. Nevertheless, we
recognize that this approach may not control for changes in driving behavior
that may correlate with Gant. If one racial group, for instance, changed
driving habits more than the other in response to Gant, the results of this
methodology may pick up changes in driving behavior rather than changes
in police conduct.210
Thus, as a final way of estimating the differential effect of Gant on race,
we employ a triple-difference model. This approach calculates the
difference-in-differences equations for white and nonwhite individuals for
the twelve jurisdictions that followed Belton before 2009 and Gant after 2009
(our treatment). It then compares this to the difference-in-differences for
white and nonwhite individuals in the Massachusetts state patrol data (our
control group).
The resulting difference between these two
difference-in-differences tells us whether the gap between the treatment of
white and nonwhite drivers in our treatment group shifted relative to our
control group. Prior studies have used this type of triple-difference approach
to estimate the racially disparate effects of a change in law regulating police
behavior.211
III. THE EFFECTS OF GANT ON POLICING
The debate surrounding Belton and Gant—and searches incident to arrest
more generally—raises two major questions. First, do limitations on the
ability of police officers to search places incident to arrest put officer safety
at risk? If so, this threat may be particularly pronounced in the context of
arrests made in automobiles or as part of traffic stops. Second, does the rather
technical shift from Belton to Gant make a difference in police behavior?
And, if police officers used the generous Belton rule in conjunction with the
rules from Whren and Atwater to conduct pretextual stops and arrests, did the
shift from Belton to Gant also contribute to a reduction in the pretextual
targeting of individuals, particularly racial minorities?212
As explained in this Part, we find no evidence that Gant reduced officer
safety. Additionally, we find that in the aggregate, Gant was associated with
few statistically significant changes in officer behavior. However, we find
some evidence that the effects of Gant were felt most acutely by individuals
of color, who saw traffic stops, arrests, searches, and searches incident to
arrest decline relative to white individuals. Parts III.A–D walk through the
results of our empirical examination.

210. This, of course, assumes that the average driver was aware of the Gant decision and
consciously changed their driving habits accordingly. This seems unlikely, in our estimation.
But we flag it as a potential issue nonetheless.
211. Rushin & Edwards, supra note 143, at 690–93 (using triple-difference to estimate the
differential effect of daylight on traffic stops of white and nonwhite drivers before and after a
shift in Washington law).
212. See supra Part II.B (describing the importance of Whren and Atwater in relationship
to Gant and Belton).
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A. The Effect of Gant on Officer Safety
Contrary to the predictions of some law enforcement advocates,213 we fail
to find any evidence that Gant contributed to increased officer assaults. First,
it may be useful to examine the trends in total officer assaults over time. The
dashed trend line represents the number of assaults of officers in jurisdictions
that have adopted restrictive rules on vehicle searches incident to arrest
similar to Gant throughout this time period (our control group). The solid
trend line represents jurisdictions that followed the Belton rule through 2009
and Gant thereafter (our treatment group). The dashed vertical line signifies
the date of the Gant decision.
Figure 2: Officer Traffic Assaults of Per Capita Treatment (Solid Line)
and Control (Dashed Line) Jurisdictions

As seen in Figure 2, there does not appear to be any obvious, visual
evidence for changes in the number of officer assaults per capita before and
after Gant. The trend lines for both groups move roughly together. This
suggests that the relative danger faced by officers during traffic stops was
generally unchanged by the Gant Court restricting officer power to search
vehicles incident to arrest. But it may be that the total risk faced by law
enforcement officers has changed over this time period, skewing the trend
lines in Figure 2. To address this possibility, Figure 3 graphs the number of
traffic assaults as a proportion of all officer assaults in both our treatment
(solid line) and control jurisdictions (dashed line).
213. See generally Brief for National Association of Policing Organizations, Inc. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 14.
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Figure 3: Traffic Assaults as Proportion of All Officer Assaults in
Treatment (Solid Line) and Control (Dashed Line) Jurisdictions

Figure 3 shows that the proportion of all officer assaults that occurred
during traffic stops remained relatively similar in both control and treatment
jurisdictions over time, regardless of the Gant decision. This is mostly
consistent with the hypothesis that Gant exerted little to no effect on officer
safety during traffic stops. To further test this hypothesis, Table 1 reports the
results of our more sophisticated modeling to estimate Gant’s effects on the
frequency of traffic assaults.
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percent change in assaults where rates regressions report the change in rates. The count regression coefficients report the change in
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weighted by state population, that does not change the result.
^p < 0.10, †p < 0.05, ‡p < 0.01
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Table 1 finds no evidence that Gant caused any statistically significant
change in officer assaults. Regardless of whether we examine traffic assault
counts, traffic assaults per capita, or traffic assaults as a proportion of all
officer assaults, Gant is associated with no statistically significant change in
our treatment group relative to our control group. The results in Table 1
remain unchanged, regardless of whether we use rates, logged rates, or
counts. They are also insensitive to the introduction of controls. At most,
our models suggest that Gant was associated with no more than a very small
and statistically insignificant increase in officer assaults.
B. The Effect of Gant on Searches Incident to Arrest
Next, we examine the effect of Gant on officer behavior. In Figure 4, we
begin by comparing the frequency of searches that co-occur with arrest in our
control and treatment groups across this time period. The solid trend line
represents the frequency of these types of searches in the Massachusetts state
patrol database, which serves as our control. The dashed trend line represents
jurisdictions that followed Belton through 2009 and Gant thereafter (our
treatment group). Like in Figures 2 and 3, the dashed vertical line signifies
the date of the Gant decision. If Gant influenced officer searches incident to
arrest, we would expect the gap between these two lines to change after 2009.
Figure 4: Effect of Gant on Searches Incident to Arrest Treatment (Dashed
Line) and Control (Solid Line) Jurisdictions
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As seen in Figure 4, the two trend lines generally move together, and the
gap between the two lines remains relatively stable throughout the time
period. This suggests that, in the aggregate, Gant may have had little effect
on the overall number of searches incident to arrest. This may be because,
even after Gant, police officers are still able to use other doctrinal tools like
inventory searches to engage in some vehicle searches incident to arrest.214
Gant could have simply resulted in some officers shifting from using the
Belton doctrine to justify vehicle searches incident to arrest to using the
inventory search doctrine to justify many of these same searches.
But as discussed in Part II.D, there is also reason to believe that Gant’s
narrowing of officer discretion to search vehicles incident to arrest
particularly limited pretextual policing tactics that disproportionately impact
individuals of color.215 If this is the case, then we might expect the data in
Figure 4 to mask the more nuanced changes in police behavior that is directed
at individuals of color. To consider this possibility, Figure 5 compares the
number of searches incident to arrest of nonwhite individuals (dashed trend
line) and white individuals (solid line) in our treatment jurisdictions.
Figure 5: Effect of Gant on Searches Incident to Arrest for White (Solid
Line) and Nonwhite (Dashed Line) Individuals in Treatment Jurisdictions

214. See supra note 26.
215. As discussed earlier in the Article, criminal procedure rulings often have disparate
effects on individuals of color. For example, prior research has argued that seemingly
race-neutral doctrines permitting stops and frisks, pretextual stops, and consent searches
disparately impact Black and Hispanic individuals more often than white individuals. See
supra Part II.D.
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As shown in Figure 5, searches incident to arrest for nonwhite individuals
were generally higher than for white individuals throughout this time period.
The gap between the two trend lines narrows around the time of the Gant
decision. Nonwhite individuals experience a greater decline in searches
incident to arrest after Gant than white individuals. This is consistent with
the hypothesis that the capacious understanding of police authority under
Belton disproportionately harmed individuals of color. And by narrowing
this rule, Gant may have disproportionately benefited these same
communities of color. To further test these theories, Tables 2 and 3 present
the results of our difference-in-differences and triple-difference models.
Table 2 explores the aggregate effect of Gant on police officer behavior,
including the frequency of stops, searches, arrests, searches incident to arrest,
and the discovery of contraband. It does not break down police behavior by
the race of the individual targeted.
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Notes: All regressions include controls for subject age and gender. OLS outcomes are transformed to logged rates, while Poisson outcomes
are counts with the exposure set to the population. OLS results report percent changes in the outcome and Poisson regressions report
marginal changes or changes in the counts. All standard errors are clustered at the county level.
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Table 2 generally fails to find any consistent evidence that Gant influenced
police behavior in the aggregate. Under most modeling assumptions, we fail
to find any statistically significant change in stops, arrests, searches, searches
incident to arrest, or the discovery of contraband. But these estimates look
at all individuals without consideration of race. If Belton incentivized
pretextual policing that disproportionately impacted racial minorities, we
would expect the effects of Gant to also be uneven based on race. Table 3
presents the results of our triple-difference estimations testing Gant’s effect
on police behavior by race. For this analysis, we divide the traffic stop data
into two categories: those identified in the data as “white” and those
identified in the data as “nonwhite.”216 The resulting regressions specifically
show the estimated effect of Gant on the white population relative to the
nonwhite population in treatment jurisdictions relative to our control
jurisdiction, the Massachusetts state patrol.
As an additional test of the differential effect of Gant on nonwhite
populations, we also produce in Table 4 the results of a narrower
difference-in-differences estimate that focuses exclusively on the changes in
coercive police tactics directed at nonwhite individuals relative to white
individuals in our treatment jurisdictions. Essentially, Table 4 removes any
consideration of the Massachusetts state patrol as a control. Instead, it simply
compares changes in policing tactics directed at individuals of color before
and after Gant relative to the changes experienced by white individuals over
the same time period. In this model, white individuals serve as our control,
and individuals of color operate as our treatment group.

216. For more information on the categorization of “white” and “nonwhite” individuals in
our data sets, see Part III.D (describing the relatively few cases where officers failed to identify
race). Because of the relatively few cases where officers failed to identify race, we chose to
categorize as “nonwhite” all individuals not labeled as “white” in the data sets. The data sets
in this study did not raise the same complications for race classification as prior studies
utilizing Stanford Open Policing Project data. See Rushin & Edwards, supra note 143, at
668–69.
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marginal changes or changes in the counts. All standard errors are clustered at the county level.
^p < 0.10, †p < 0.05, ‡p < 0.01
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Tables 3 and 4 display moderately firmer results. Across most modeling
assumptions, we find that Gant was associated with a greater reduction in
coercive action against nonwhite individuals relative to white individuals.
This includes drops in stops, arrests, searches, and searches incident to arrest.
The models vary somewhat in the magnitude of this drop. In most cases,
though, the models agree that the reduction in coercive police actions
directed at nonwhite individuals is statistically significant. After Gant,
nonwhite individuals experienced a greater decline in traffic stops, arrests,
searches, and searches incident to arrest. In our OLS models using the
triple-difference analysis, we find Gant associated with a significant decline
in traffic stops, arrests, searches, and searches incident to arrest for nonwhite
individuals relative to white individuals. Our Poisson models in Table 3 find
similarly statistically significant drops in the same categories of police
behavior. Using the difference-in-differences approach, the OLS models
find significant reductions in the targeting of nonwhite individuals after Gant
relative to white individuals, but the Poisson models reach less consistent
findings. Across all models, we fail to find any evidence that this reduction
in police targeting had any statistically significant effect on the likelihood of
police uncovering contraband.
Overall, these findings are potentially consistent with the hypothesis that
Belton may have facilitated pretextual policing that resulted in racial
profiling. Although Gant may not have resulted in widespread shifts in
police behavior toward many drivers, its limitation on police power to
conduct vehicle searches incident to arrest may have somewhat reduced the
incentive for officers to engage in some policing tactics, disproportionally
benefitting individuals of color.
C. Event Studies
Next, as a robustness check, we measure the dynamic effect of Gant over
time and test the assumption of pretreatment parallel trends. To do this,
Figure 6 displays the point estimates and confidence interval bands for the
dynamic triple-difference estimates in Part IV. This methodology plots the
differentials between trends in searches incident to arrest of white and
nonwhite individuals in treatment and control jurisdictions over time. The
line that extends above and below each point represents confidence intervals.
If a line is entirely above or below zero, then we can say with some level of
confidence that the differential between trends for nonwhite and white
individuals is statistically significant (i.e., we reject the null hypothesis). But
if the confidence interval extends above and below zero, then we cannot
reject the null hypothesis. So, if Gant drove subsequent changes in police
behavior in treatment of individuals of color in treatment jurisdictions
relative to control jurisdictions, we would expect the differentials to become
statistically significant only around the time of Gant in 2009.
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Figure 6: Triple-Difference Event Study for Effect of Gant on Searches
Incident to Arrest for Nonwhite Individuals in Treatment Relative to
Control Jurisdictions

In most years before Gant, the confidence intervals extend above and
below zero. These differentials only become consistently significant after
the Gant decision. As an additional test, in Figure 7, we remove the
additional difference from our analysis. This figure looks merely at the
differentials in searches incident to arrest for white and nonwhite drivers only
in treatment jurisdictions.
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Figure 7: Difference-in-Differences Event Study for Effect of Gant on
Searches Incident to Arrest for Nonwhite Individuals in Treatment
Jurisdictions

Again, we see the confidence intervals extend above and below zero in the
year leading up to Gant. After Gant, we see these confidence intervals
generally fall below zero, bolstering the claim that Gant may be driving the
subsequent reductions in the frequency of police vehicle searches incident to
the arrests of nonwhite relative to white individuals.
D. Methodological Challenges and Limitations
Although we believe that this methodological approach provides some
evidence for the effect of Gant on police behavior, we recognize that our
study also has numerous limitations. First, despite the expansiveness of the
data sets used in this study, we rely primarily on one major control group—
the Massachusetts state patrol—in some of our analyses. This means that we
cannot rule out the possibility that the unique culture, training, or practices
of this state policing agency make a less-than-ideal comparison point.
Additionally, like any similar empirical study, we cannot account for every
possible variable that may be influencing police traffic stop behaviors. Our
study makes methodological choices that come with implicit trade-offs.217
For example, one major challenge we faced in specifying our models was the
217. For example, we make various assumptions in how we employ our
difference-in-differences and our triple-difference analyses, specifically in how we account
for and weigh jurisdictional population and our choice of controls.
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choice between Poisson and OLS regressions. A key assumption of OLS is
that the errors, and by extension the outcome, will be normally distributed.
Additionally, this project is unique in that data and policy change limitations
require us to compare police agencies that serve vastly different
populations.218 The nature of this project requires us to directly account for
population in some way. One approach is to use OLS and take the natural
log of the per capita arrest or search rate. The per capita rate addresses the
issue of population scale, and the log addresses the assumption of normality.
Nevertheless, this approach creates issues with reports of zero arrests or
searches since the log of zero is mathematically undefined. We remedy this
by adding a nominal amount to any zero entry in the data. The advantage of
OLS is that it requires relatively few assumptions to generate unbiased
estimators. But the drawback is that it requires some data transformation.
Alternatively, Poisson regressions can handle count and truncated data.
Poisson regressions can still account for population by including population
as an exposure variable with the coefficient constrained to one. However,
this approach carries additional assumptions related to the Poisson
distribution. Specifically, Poisson regressions assume equality between the
mean and the variance of the outcome variable. Additionally, Poisson
regressions report coefficients that are not always intuitive in interpretation.
Thus, when we employ Poisson regressions, we transform each coefficient
into marginal effects, allowing them to be interpreted in the same way as the
OLS regressions.
We also recognize that attempting to control for populations raises
benchmark challenges. We do not know, for example, the exact number of
drivers of various races on the road at any given time.219 The demographics
of drivers on a specific highway rarely match the underlying population of
the county or city where that population lies.220 Ideally, we would prefer not
to utilize population adjustments, given that residential population is a poor

218. For example, twenty-five arrests in Big Sky County, Montana, means something very
different than twenty-five arrests in the entire state of Maryland. Previous studies have been
able to skirt these population issues (and other issues of baseline comparison) by restricting
the geographical region to one state or jurisdiction (and assuming that population by race does
not vary heterogeneously across county). See Rushin & Edwards, supra note 143, at 659–64,
669–73 (discussing the choice in that study to not adjust for population when studying trends
over time in a single agency, in part because of the challenges of identifying an adequate
benchmark for the number of drivers of various races on the roads patrolled by the Washington
State Patrol).
219. Id. at 669–73 nn.182–98 (providing a list of citations demonstrating the significant
challenges in developing an adequate benchmark to represent the number of drivers of various
demographic categories).
220. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Alpert, Roger G. Dunham & Michael R. Smith, Investigating
Racial Profiling by the Miami-Dade Police Department: A Multimethod Approach, 6
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 25, 32 (2007) (stating that although some researchers have used
census residential population as a benchmark for racial profiling studies, such data is “static”
and does “not represent the fluid nature of those who drove” in a specific area); see also Racial
Profiling and Traffic Stops, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Jan. 9, 2013), https://nij.ojp.gov/
topics/articles/racial-profiling-and-traffic-stops [https://perma.cc/Y2YV-J859] (concluding
that “social scientists now disregard comparisons to the census for assessing racial bias”).
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proxy for driving population. This means that adjustments using residential
population may skew our data. Had our study analyzed a single agency, we
would have relied on levels rather than per capita rates adjusted for
population, consistent with prior studies.221 Nevertheless, because we
compare data from numerous jurisdictions of widely varied sizes from across
the country (and because an additional search in a sparsely populated state is
more significant than an additional search in a heavily populated state), we
believe it is necessary to include some type of population weighting for at
least some of our models. To account for the possibility that population
weighting may influence our results, we attempt to provide the results of
numerous specifications of our models. Even so, we caution that our findings
fall short of proving that Gant (or Gant-like state equivalents) necessarily
caused the effects we observe.
Finally, we define “nonwhite” for the purposes of this study as any
individual not coded as “white” in the requisite data set. The data used in
this project include very few cases of officers failing to identify the apparent
race of individuals. For example, officers in Massachusetts failed to identify
a suspect’s race in only 0.55 percent of all cases, and in Maryland in only
0.86 percent of cases. Thus, we believe that our definition fairly
distinguishes between those individuals believed by officers to be “white”
and “nonwhite,” without raising some of the challenges faced by prior
researchers relying on the data from other jurisdictions or agencies in the
Stanford Open Policing Project database.222
Overall, although evidence presented in this Article falls short of proving
a definitive causal link, the results of these models and event studies bolster
the hypothesis that the Gant decision may have influenced subsequent
changes in police treatment of racial minorities.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICING LITERATURE
Our findings have several implications for the literature on police
accountability and reform. More narrowly, our results suggest that some of
the concerns expressed by police advocates may have been overstated.
Relatedly, our findings also demonstrate that advocates may have failed to
recognize the implications of the Gant decision on communities of color.
More generally, though, our findings contribute to a growing body of
literature that suggests that rules granting frontline officers significant
discretionary authority frequently contribute to racial disparities. This, we
argue, should further caution policy makers to consider rules that limit
discretion to ensure that officers police communities fairly and equitably.

221. See Rushin & Edwards, supra note 143, at 669 (explaining the authors’ prior decision
“not to convert [their] dataset from raw stop numbers into rates of stops per capita” in a study
of a single agency).
222. Id. at 668–69.
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A. Refuting the Officer Danger Narrative
To begin with, our study refutes the claim that Gant risked officer safety.
As Professor Jordan Blair Woods has previously written, police officers
conduct millions of traffic stops annually, and the “dominant narrative in
policing is that each one of these stops is not just highly dangerous but also
potentially fatal.”223 This assumption permeates police training material and
departmental culture.224 As former police officer turned law professor Seth
Stoughton bluntly concluded, “[p]olice training starts in the academy, where
the concept of officer safety is so heavily emphasized that it takes on almost
religious significance.”225
Concern for officer safety has also contributed to courts granting police
officers wide-ranging discretion during traffic stops.226 Professor Alice
Ristroph explained that “courts defer almost invariably to police officers’
later accounts of their perceptions of danger or resistance.”227 And in making
judgments about what limitations or regulations may put officer safety at risk,
courts commonly defer to police expertise, as documented by Professor Anna
Lvovsky.228 Indeed, despite declining rates of officer deaths in the line of
duty in recent decades,229 narratives about officer danger continue to shape
officer regulation and socialization.230 As Professor Michael Sierra-Arévalo
observed, there remains a widespread assumption that policing is a uniquely
223. Woods, supra note 30, at 638–39 (discussing “[t]he idea that routine traffic stops pose
grave and unpredictable danger to the police” and how it influences policing more generally).
224. Seth W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1363, 1397 (2018)
(“One common theme can be found in ‘officer survival’ videos, which attempt to remind
officers of the dangers of complacency by showing officers being brutally attacked, disarmed,
or killed.” (footnotes omitted)).
225. Seth Stoughton, How Police Training Contributes to Avoidable Deaths, ATLANTIC
(Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/12/police-gun-shootingtraining-ferguson/383681 [https://perma.cc/M8HK-4QBX] (noting how officers are shown
during training “heart-wrenching dash-cam footage of officers being beaten, disarmed, or
gunned down after a moment of inattention or hesitation”).
226. Woods, supra note 30, at 638 n.8. For more examples of safety narratives influencing
police regulation, see Roger Michalski & Stephen Rushin, Police Executive Opinions of Legal
Regulation, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1841, 1854–57.
227. Alice Ristroph, The Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1182, 1210
(2017). It is also worth noting that, like other scholars, Ristroph is skeptical of many of the
safety concerns frequently invoked by courts to justify expansions of officer power or
authority. Id. at 1189 (“It is doubtful whether Fourth Amendment doctrine’s permissiveness
of police violence maximizes officer safety or public safety, and the broad authority to use
force clearly puts suspects in peril.”).
228. Anna Lvovsky, The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1995, 2033 (2017) (explaining, for example, how “[i]n California, where judges had long
approved investigatory stops based simply on public safety, they now defended that practice
based on the ‘[e]xperienced’ police officer’s ‘ability to perceive the unusual and suspicious’”
(quoting People v. Cowman, 223 Cal. App. 2d 109, 117 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963))).
229. Michael D. White, Lisa M. Dario & John A. Shjarback, Assessing Dangerousness in
Policing: An Analysis of Officer Deaths in the United States, 1970–2016, 18 CRIMINOLOGY
& PUB. POL’Y 11, 27 (2019) (“The most compelling finding from the current study is how
dramatically the dangerousness of policing has declined since 1970.”).
230. Seth Stoughton, Law Enforcement’s “Warrior” Problem, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 225,
227 (2015) (connecting the training that officers receive about danger and safety to the broader
development of a “warrior” culture within policing).
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and “profoundly dangerous” profession that puts officers “in the cross-hairs
of . . . criminals” at every turn.231
Our study contributes to this literature by refuting some of the officer
danger narratives specifically relied upon by opponents of Gant. In their
amicus brief in Gant, the National Association of Policing Organizations
heavily emphasized the link between the Belton bright-line rule and officer
safety.232 They claimed that “[l]aw enforcement work, never particularly
safe, has unfortunately become even more dangerous to the men and women
who enforce our social contract at great personal risk.”233 They argued that
42 percent of attacks against law enforcement happen during traffic stops or
arrests.234 They reminded the Supreme Court of previous cases, like
Pennsylvania v. Mimms,235 where it recognized the importance of officer
safety.236 They also claimed that adopting anything other than the bright-line
Belton rule would put officers at an “unnecessary risk of a deadly attack.”237
To be clear, our study cannot claim that all law enforcement regulation can
be accomplished without reducing officer safety. As discussed in this part,
we also cannot discount the possibility that officers responded to Gant by
simply pulling back in circumstances where they believed that a search
incident to arrest would have served a legitimate law enforcement purpose,
thus ensuring officer safety at the expense of police effectiveness. Even so,
our findings are at least consistent with the hypothesis that some of these
claims of trade-offs between regulation and officer safety in this specific
context are likely overstated.
This makes sense because, as the justices observed in Gant, officers have
long been trained to handcuff and secure an arrestee in the back of their squad
car before conducting a vehicle search incident to arrest.238 Gant likely did
not change this practice; it merely removed the ability of an officer to search
the vehicle automatically thereafter. As Justice Antonin Scalia observed in
his concurrence, any risk to law enforcement officer safety is likely not
“reduced by allowing a search of the stopped vehicle after the driver has been

231. See Sierra-Arévalo, supra note 30, at 70–71 (concluding more broadly that these
danger imperatives emphasize violence and ensure both “policy-compliant” and
“policy-deviant” behavior by officers to protect officer safety).
232. Brief for National Association of Policing Organizations, Inc. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 14, at 1–4 (claiming in Part I of the brief that
“[c]onsiderations of officer safety justify a bright-line rule allowing warrantless vehicle
searches incident to a recent occupant’s arrest and confinement”).
233. Id. at 2.
234. Id.
235. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
236. Brief for National Association of Policing Organizations, Inc. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 14, at 2–3.
237. Id. at 3; see also Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110.
238. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351–52 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“When an
arrest is made in connection with a roadside stop, police virtually always have a less intrusive
and more effective means of ensuring their safety—and a means that is virtually always
employed: ordering the arrestee away from the vehicle, patting him down in the open,
handcuffing him, and placing him in the squad car.”).
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arrested and placed in the squad car.”239 In fact, as Justice Scalia observed
both in Gant and in Thornton v. United States,240 the Court has failed to
identify “a single instance in which a formerly restrained arrestee escaped to
retrieve a weapon from his own vehicle.”241 This should caution future
courts from relying on such concerns to justify coercive police actions under
the Fourth Amendment.
B. Failure to Recognize the Racially Disparate Implications of
Belton and Gant
Our findings suggest that courts may not be adequately considering the
way that seemingly neutral criminal procedure rulings can have disparate
effects based on race. The justices in Belton and Gant carefully documented
various concerns and objections to the proposed regulations of law
enforcement behavior.242 For example, in Gant, the majority and dissenting
opinions considered the implications of the decision for officer safety,243
evidentiary preservation,244 privacy interests,245 and the doctrine of stare
decisis.246 The justices also debated whether the decision established a
workable rule that law enforcement could employ without confusion.247 The
majority, concurrence, and dissenting opinions are lengthy and detailed.248
Yet, none of these opinions consider the disparate implications of the ruling
for communities of color. Indeed, as Professor Cooper wrote in 2012, “Gant
never mentions the fact that racial minorities are much more likely to suffer
the consequences of an open-ended rule.”249
This is not the first time that the Court has issued seemingly neutral
criminal procedure rulings, without discussing race, that ultimately have had
differential effects on racial minorities. Remember that the Whren Court held
that officers may engage in pretextual traffic stops; as long as an officer can
identify an objective violation of the traffic code, the officer may conduct a
traffic stop, even if their real motivation for the stop is to investigate an
unsubstantiated hunch that fails to provide probable cause for a stop.250 In
that case, the petitioners directly raised the implication of the Court’s
potential ruling for Black individuals, arguing that they were more likely to
239. Id. at 352.
240. 541 U.S. 615, 626 (2004).
241. Gant, 556 U.S. at 352 (Scalia, J. concurring).
242. Id. at 332–51 (majority opinion).
243. Id. at 346 (“Contrary to the State’s suggestion, a broad reading of Belton is also
unnecessary to protect law enforcement safety . . . .”).
244. Id. (further noting alternative exceptions that allow for the preservation of evidence).
245. Id. at 344–45 (“[T]he State seriously undervalues the privacy interests at stake . . . .”).
246. Id. at 351 (“The doctrine of stare decisis does not require us to approve routine
constitutional violations.”).
247. Id. at 360–61 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing concerns about the workability of rules
surrounding searches incident to arrest and the need for clear rules).
248. The Gant opinions together include over thirty pages of debate. See id. at 332–65.
249. Cooper, supra note 153, at 117.
250. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“We think these cases foreclose
any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual
motivations of the individual officers involved.”).
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be targeted for pretextual stops than white drivers.251 But even there, the
Court quickly dismissed such concern by stating that “the Constitution
prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as
race,” and any such claims must be made via the Equal Protection Clause and
not via Fourth Amendment challenges to the reasonableness of the traffic
stop.252
Numerous scholars objected to the Court’s holding in Whren on the ground
that it would exacerbate racial disparities in policing.253 At least one
subsequent empirical study has found evidence that laws granting police
discretionary authority to engage in pretextual stops may contribute to higher
numbers of stops of drivers of color.254 But some other criminal procedure
rules that similarly grant police wider discretion to engage in coercive
behavior, like Belton, have not received similar scrutiny. The results from
this study suggest that advocates and courts should pay greater attention to
the effects of policing rules on racial minorities.
C. Limiting Police Discretion to Combat Racial Disparities
Finally, our results suggest that, to combat racial disparities, policy makers
should consider limiting police discretionary authority. Discretion exists out
of necessity throughout the criminal justice system, including in decisions to
investigate, arrest, prosecute, and sentence suspected offenders.255 There are
strong policy reasons for granting discretionary authority to many actors
within the criminal justice system. Discretion allows for the tailoring and
individualization of criminal justice interventions to the needs of specific
offenders or community demands.256 Discretion may also allow actors
251. Id. at 810 (“Petitioners, who are both black, further contend that police officers might
decide which motorists to stop based on decidedly impermissible factors, such as the race of
the car’s occupants.”).
252. Id. at 813.
253. See supra note 119 (citing numerous studies criticizing Whren).
254. See Rushin & Edwards, supra note 143, at 683–96 (showing a decline in stops of
drivers of color and nonwhite drivers after Washington moved to regulate pretextual stops and
using a veil-of-darkness methodology to test the effect of light on officer stops of drivers).
255. Lloyd E. Ohlin, Surveying Discretion by Criminal Justice Decision Makers, in
DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE TENSION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALIZATION AND
UNIFORMITY 1, 1–4 (Lloyd E. Ohlin & Frank J. Remington eds., 1993) (explaining that the
book’s essays describe the need for and challenges of limiting discretion in the criminal justice
system, and chronicling the scope of discretion in the system generally); see also Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 43
(1988) (“In criminal justice, as perhaps nowhere else in the American legal system, the life
and liberty of the citizen are exposed to the largely uncontrolled discretion of individual public
officials.”); George C. Thomas, III, Discretion and Criminal Law: The Good, the Bad, and
the Mundane, 109 DICK. L. REV. 1043, 1043 (2005) (“Discretion in enforcement and
prosecution of crime is inevitable; it can be restrained at the margin but it cannot be
eliminated.”).
256. Griffin Edwards, Stephen Rushin & Joseph Colquitt, The Effects of Voluntary and
Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1, 8 (2019) (“Those holding such
discretion—be they trial court judges, correctional officials, or parole boards—should
theoretically use it to tailor criminal sentences to the specific culpability of each criminal
offender.”).
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within the justice system to effectively allocate their limited time and
resources.257 Even so, discretion invites discrimination and inequality.
For example, prosecutors have wide discretion to make charging decisions
in most cases. Some studies have found that prosecutors use this largely
unfettered discretion to charge individuals of color more frequently or more
severely than similarly situated white individuals.258 Similar evidence
suggests that prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining may contribute to
racial disparities.259 Evidence of racial bias in criminal sentencing is
extensive—and often tied to the discretion granted to judges or juries within
the criminal justice system.260 Criminal sentencing systems that grant judges
wider discretion may contribute to Black defendants receiving longer
sentences than white defendants.261
Similarly, criminal sentencing
guidelines that limit judicial discretion are associated with decreases in racial
disparities in sentencing.262
Perhaps no actors within the criminal justice system have more
discretionary authority than police officers.263 Extensive evidence suggests

257. Charles D. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427,
427 (1960) (noting that if police were not given discretion and instead had to strictly enforce
every violation of the law, “the criminal law would be ordered but intolerable”); Thomas,
supra note 255, at 1043 (using the example of jaywalking as an example to say that
“[p]resumably, the average officer working a beat sees hundreds of jaywalkers every day and
probably arrests none”).
258. Marvin D. Free, Jr., Race and Presentencing Decisions in the United States: A
Summary and Critique of the Research, 27 CRIM. JUST. REV. 203, 210–14 (2002) (providing
in Table 2 a list of studies of the impact of race on prosecutors’ decisions to file or dismiss
charges and noting that several of them found evidence of racial disparities).
259. See generally Carlos Berdejo, Criminalizing Race:
Racial Disparities in
Plea-Bargaining, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 1187 (2018) (finding that white defendants are 25
percent more likely than Black defendants to have their initial charges dropped or reduced to
a lesser offense at the plea bargaining stage, with greater disparities for minor offenses than
for felonies); Christi Metcalfe & Ted Chiricos, Race, Plea, and Charge Reduction: An
Assessment of Racial Disparities in the Plea Process, 35 JUST. Q. 223 (2018) (similarly finding
racial disparities in plea bargaining, particularly affecting Black males).
260. Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory
Guidelines Regime?: Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1270–71 (2014)
(noting the “almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers we give to judges in the
fashioning of sentences” and also finding that the move away from the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines after Booker likely contributed to disparities (quoting MARVIN E. FRANKEL,
CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1973))).
261. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING pt. E, at 2–3 (2012), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/booker-reports/2012-booker/Part_E.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3YKT-52U6] (finding several examples of racial disparities between
similarly situated white and nonwhite offenders).
262. Edwards, Rushin & Colquitt, supra note 256, at 47–52 (showing particularly in
Figures 13 and 14 that moving from no sentencing guidelines, to voluntary sentencing
guidelines, and then to presumptive sentencing guidelines likely contributed to a reduction in
racial disparities, consistent with the hypothesis that reducing discretion may also reduce
inequality).
263. Simon Bronitt & Philip Stenning, Understanding Discretion in Modern Policing, 35
CRIM L.J. 319, 320–21 (2011) (stating that police officers have discretion in “(1) choosing
objectives; (2) choosing methods of intervention; (3) choosing how to dispose of cases;
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that police officers sometimes use their discretionary authority in a manner
that disproportionately harms communities of color. Traffic officers often
must exercise discretion in conducting traffic stops. Extensive evidence
suggests that officers may use this discretion to target drivers of color more
often than white drivers.264 Officers must frequently exercise discretion in
conducting so-called stops and frisks of pedestrians.265 There, too, evidence
of racially disparate abuse is prevalent.266 Officers must make split-second
decisions to draw their weapons or use physical force in response to a
perceived threat.267 Multiple studies have argued that such discretionary
decisions disparately harm similarly situated nonwhite individuals relative to
white individuals.268 Police officers exercise discretion in their arrest
(4) choosing investigative measures; (5) choosing field procedures; and (6) issuing permits
and licenses”).
264. See, e.g., PETER VERNIERO & PAUL H. ZOUBEK, INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE
REVIEW TEAM REGARDING ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING 26–28, 67–68 (1999),
https://www.state.nj.us/lps/intm_419.pdf [https://perma.cc/5T8Y-25PG] (finding nonwhite
drivers were treated differently than white drivers in terms of consent searches and hit rates of
searches); DAVID A. HARRIS, ACLU, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: RACIAL PROFILING ON OUR
NATION’S HIGHWAYS (1999), https://www.aclu.org/report/driving-while-black-racialprofiling-our-nations-highways [https://perma.cc/HMK5-JUSK] (concluding that Latinos
make up a disproportionate number of those stopped by police, particularly of those stopped
by drug interdiction units); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and
Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Probable Cause, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 296, 299–306 (2001) (chronicling many of the then existing studies on racial
profiling); Rushin & Edwards, supra note 143, at 658 (noting that “racial-profiling research is
a major field of study with academics, government agencies, and nonprofits all regularly
producing studies” and that “an extensive and growing body of literature suggests that police
treat drivers of color differently than white drivers”).
265. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (giving police officers the right to
conduct limited stops and frisks based on reasonable suspicion).
266. See, e.g., Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York
City Police Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias,
102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813, 821 (2007) (“In the period for which we had data, the NYPD’s
records indicate that they were stopping blacks and Hispanics more often than whites, in
comparison to both the population of these groups and the best estimates of the rates of crimes
committed by each group.”); Sharad Goel, Justin M. Rao & Ravi Shroff, Precinct or
Prejudice?: Understanding Racial Disparities in New York City’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, 10
ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 365, 367 (2016) (finding that Black and Hispanic individuals were
disproportionately targeted for low-hit stops in New York City); John MacDonald & Anthony
A. Braga, Did Post-Floyd et al. Reforms Reduce Racial Disparities in NYPD Stop, Question,
and Frisk Practices?: An Exploratory Analysis Using External and Internal Benchmarks, 36
JUST. Q. 954, 977–80 (2019) (finding that racial disparities in the treatment of individuals of
color relative to white individuals diminished substantially after the court settlement
regulating stop-and-frisk practices in New York); Philip J. Levchak, Stop-and-Frisk in New
York City: Estimating Racial Disparities in Post-Stop Outcomes, 73 J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 10
(2021) (“The results show that being black or Latino is associated with being frisked and
experiencing force—particularly non-weapon force.”).
267. Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV.
211, 214 (2017) (describing the language used by the U.S. Supreme Court in
officer-use-of-force cases like Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), which describes how
police must make “split-second judgments” about the necessity to use force).
268. See, e.g., Frank Edwards, Hedwig Lee & Michael Esposito, Risk of Being Killed by
Police Use of Force in the United States by Age, Race-Ethnicity, and Sex, 116 PNAS 16,793,
16,795–96 (2019) (finding African American individuals are at an elevated risk of killing by
police officers relative to other demographics); Justin Nix, Bradley A. Campbell, Edward H.
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decisions, which, some studies find, results in unequal treatment based on
race.269 More generally, law enforcement supervisors across the country
regularly make discretionary decisions on how best to allocate law
enforcement personnel, which may also disproportionately affect
communities of color.270
A large body of prior research has tied discretion in the criminal justice
system to racially disparate outcomes. The findings from this Article add to
this growing literature. They suggest that by limiting police discretion to
search vehicles incident to arrest in Gant, the Court may have reduced the
racially disparate effects of some pretextual policing tactics. This may
caution policy makers to consider other limitations on discretionary and
pretextual policing tactics. Admittedly, it is unlikely that the Court will
overturn its decisions in Atwater or Whren anytime soon. But some
jurisdictions have taken steps to limit the ability of police officers to engage
in pretextual policing. Professor Margaret M. Lawton found that some states
have limited the use of pretextual traffic stops more than the federal
constitutional minimum established in Whren.271 Similarly, jurisdictions are
free to establish more stringent limitations on arrests for minor offenses that
cannot result in a punishment of incarceration, despite the Court’s holding in
Atwater. The findings from our study suggest that jurisdictions interested in
reducing racial disparities in policing should consider establishing more
stringent regulations of discretionary policing tactics.
CONCLUSION
At the time of the decision, Gant served as a flash point for the broader
debate over the trade-offs implicit in police regulation. But although the
decision spent considerable time considering issues like officer safety,
administrability, and stare decisis, there was no substantial discussion of the
ways that modern American law enforcement used vehicle searches incident
to arrest as part of a broader toolbox of pretextual policing tactics. Nor was
there a discussion of how this type of pretextual policing may
disproportionately impact communities of color. The results from this study
suggest that some scholars and advocates have overlooked the potentially
Byers & Geoffrey P. Alpert, A Bird’s Eye View of Civilians Killed by Police in 2015: Further
Evidence of Implicit Bias, 16 AM. SOC’Y CRIMINOLOGY 309, 328–29 (2017) (finding that
individuals labeled as “other” in racial or ethnic signifiers were significantly more likely than
white individuals to have not been attacking an officer during a fatal encounter, and that Black
individuals were around twice as likely to be unarmed during fatal encounters than white
individuals).
269. See, e.g., Tammy Rinehart Kochel, David B. Wilson & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Effect
of Suspect Race on Officers’ Arrest Decisions, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 473, 490 (2011) (finding that
being a racial minority increased probability of arrest).
270. Andrew P. Wheeler, Allocating Police Resources While Limiting Racial Inequality,
37 JUST. Q. 842, 843–47 (2020) (detailing the challenges faced by law enforcement
departments in allocating personnel efficiently and effectively to address public safety
concerns without exacerbating unequal treatment of individuals based on race).
271. Margaret M. Lawton, State Responses to the Whren Decision, 66 CASE W. RSRV. L.
REV. 1039, 1040–41 (2016).
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racially disparate effects of vehicle searches incident to arrest. We find that
by curbing police power to search vehicles incident to arrest, the Gant
decision may have reduced the frequency of coercive police actions against
individuals of color, including stops, searches, arrests, and vehicle searches
incident to arrest, without impairing the discovery of contraband. We further
find that this regulation of police discretionary authority was not associated
with any increase in officer assaults during traffic stops, as predicted by some
law enforcement groups. The totality of this evidence is a reminder that
seemingly neutral criminal procedure rulings can have disparate effects on
communities of color. These results suggest that rules granting officers
significant discretionary authority may advance administrability at the
expense of inequality.

